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Perspectives on the Law of "Contorts": A
Discussion of the Dominant Trends in
West German Tort Law
By GERT BRUGGEMEIER*
Dr. Jur., Frankfurt, 1973; Judge of District Court, Frankfurt, 1978" Professor
of Law, Bremen University.
No act of legislature in the world can erase a damage which has oc-
curred The law is helpless against a completed act. The legislature can
only pursue two goals vis-a-vis possible damages:
It can
(1) initiate preventive measures, as far as possible; and
(2) assign the burden of a damage which has occurred, to that party
who is best fitted to assume it, according to theprecepts of ftistice
and economic efficiency.
V. MATAJA, DAS RECHT DES SCHADEN-
SERSATZES VOM STANDPUNKT DER NA-
TIONAL6KONOMIE 19 (1888).
We build skyscrapers, though smaller dwellings might be saferfor
the builders. We run railroads, though lives might be saved if we were
satisfied to travel slowly. We experiment with airplanes, though pilots
run the risk of death ... The law will not prevent the erection of
skyscrapers. It may call for safety devices that will reduce the toll of
lives. The law will not prevent the operation of railroads. It may call
for signals and watchmen, and may raise or depress the roadbed at the
crossing of a highway.
B. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LE-
GAL SCIENCE 57, 59 (1928).
* This Article grew out of a discussion paper presented at the School of Law (Boalt
Hall), University of California at Berkeley in December 1981. A more extensive version was
published in German, Brtlggemeier, GeselIschaftliche Schadensnerteilung und Delikisrecht,
182 ARCHIV FOR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS [AcP] 385 (1982), with detailed references to the
German discussion. The author is indebted to many people and organizations for the com-
pletion of this article, especially to Dick Buxbaum who encouraged the first draft and to
Nancy Reagin and Frances Dielmann who helped with translation. This piece is dedicated
to Walter Pakter for his exceptional willingness to discuss the first paper.
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I. THE SOCIAL PROBLEMS OF DISTRIBUTION AND
PREVENTION OF LOSSES AND THE LAW OF
TORTS
A. Methods of Loss Distribution: Internalization, Externalization,
and Spreading
The law of damages' in general and tort law in particular are
mainly concerned with the distribution of the costs and risks inherent
in relationships among members of society. Since the end of the nine-
teenth century, two methods have existed for the apportionment of so-
cial costs: the costs can be allocated to one of the two parties of an
identifiable injuring party/injured party relationship; or the risks and
costs can be spread over a generalized category of risk bearers (e.g.,
driver/pedestrian, employer/employee, or producer/consumer) or over
the taxpayer.2
Three forms of loss apportionment are possible in the injured
party/injuring party relationship: first, the losses can be assumed
solely by the injured party (the absolute property rule); second, they
can be assumed by the injuring party (the absolute liability rule); or
third, they can be divided between the two parties. This division of
liability by externalization on the injured party and internalization by
the injuring party is the chief form of loss apportionment in Western
civil law. The injuring party (or tortfeasor) can assume costs for both a
combination of unavoidable and avoidable damages (strict liability) or
for only avoidable damages-either those caused by intentional con-
duct or through negligence (tort fault liability). Any costs not so ab-
sorbed by the injuring party remain part of the residual risk of the
injured party (the property rule).
3
The loss can also be passed on to a third party, however. Insur-
ance is the most common means of spreading the loss. Instead of hav-
ing damage indemnification assumed by either the injured or the
injuring party, all insured parties collectively assume the risks and
make reparations. Insurance can assume two forms: the individual
purchase of insurance by the specific risk bearers (the private insurance
model); or a compulsory insurance legally guaranteed by the state (the
social insurance model). The costs of damage compensation and pre-
vention are assumed by the insured parties unless such costs are shifted
1. Damages as used in this paper refer only to compensatory damages and not to puni-
tive damages. The latter are rare in German civil law.
2. See infra note 4.
3. See infra p. 361.
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to the tortfeasor by means of recoupment.4
Tort law is only concerned with internalization of costs. Such a
functional description of tort law, as a process of conditional shifting of
loss to the injuring party and the relationship of this loss distribution to
other social methods of risk allocation still leaves untouched the prob-
lem of concrete distribution of risks as determined by national tort law.
Three basic questions must be answered: (1) which social goals should
the distribution of risks serve: economic growth and efficiency s com-
pensation and income distribution, or merely a morally right and just
settlement;6 (2) what interests are to be protected legally: the distribut-
able social costs, the financial or nonfinancial damage, substantial inju-
ries or disturbances; and (3) who shall carry the burden of damages?
In Germany, the legislature exercised its jurisdiction and political
freedom of decision to answer these questions through promulgation of
the Bilrgerliches Gesetzbuch7 in 1896. Academic jurists had long con-
sidered these three basic questions of liability law to have been an-
swered by this legislation. They saw the first question (social goals) as
decided primarily in favor of an individual assumption of loss by the
tortfeasor-if it was a case clearly within the narrow range of tort lia-
bility law-secondarily for special or general prevention of injurious
behavior. Furthering any other social goals was seen as a basic polit-
ical decision concerning the economic freedom of responsible citizens,
which was to be left to the legislature's jurisdiction. The second ques-
tion (protected interests) was answered in sections 249 through 255 of
the German Civil Code and particularly in special code sections on
contract and tort law. Sections 823 to 853 addressed the third question
(risk bearing), and it was left to academics to clarify and systematize
the existing liability law by developing such dogmatic concepts as ob-
jective elements of a tort (Tatbestand), unlawfulness (Rechtswidrigkeit),
culpability, absolute/relative subjective rights, breach of duty, foresee-
4. See Brilggemeier, Gesellschaftliche Schadensverleilung undDelilsrecht, 182 ARcHliv
FOR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS [AcP] 385, 402 (1982).
5. But cf. R.A. POSNER, ECONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977), setting out the
University of Chicago economic analysis, and the current discussions in the JOURNAL OF
LEGAL STUDIES.
6. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971), and the following international discus-
sions in German: EDER, FRANKENBERG, R5DEL & TUGENDHAT, DIE ENTWICKLUNG VON
GERECHTIGKEITSVORSTELLUNGEN IM MODERNEN RECHT ALS SOZIOLOGISCHES PROBLEM
(Starnberg typescript 1978); E. TUGENDHAT, Begrnindungsstrukturen im modernen Recht,
ARCHIV FOR REcTrrs- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE [ARSP] 14 (supp. 1980).
7. BGB or West German Civil Code. All section references in this Article are to the
BGB, unless otherwise noted. The process of BGB legislation is documented in DIE
GESAMTEN MATERIALIEN ZUM BGB (Mugdan ed. 1899).
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ability, adequacy, etc., and to simplify and rationalize application of
the law through the development of a legal method (Jursdische
Methode).8 The judiciary merely enforced this dogmatically and me-
thodically developed legal structure by applying strict legal logic to in-
dividual cases.
The political answer given by the drafters of the BGB was depend-
ent upon the stage of socio-economic and cultural development
achieved in that period. Similarly, the political solution to these three
basic questions is contained in modem liability law. The three basic
social goals for tort law--economic efficiency, social distribution of in-
come, and equity or ethical considerations-have carried differing
weight in each phase of social development. The structure of civil lia-
bility law in West Germany and the extent and form of its functional
equivalents, such as the principle of public and private insurance, are
the result of varying sets of goals set in different periods of economic
development and under differing economic structures of German soci-
ety in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 9
In general, one can assert that German legal development, like
that of comparable Western industrial societies, reflected the axioms of
the laissez-faire industrialization phase of the nineteenth century in its
tendency towards assumption of damage cost by the injured party, ex-
cept when the injuring party was at fault (fault liability), and its spread-
ing of risks and costs among those with private insurance (I e., loss and
liability insurance). As the evolving industrial society matured, the
state through legislative or judicial channels increasingly amended this
earlier industrial doctrine of assumption of damage by the injured
party. First, losses were redistributed in the injured party/injuring
party relationship in that losses were increasingly assumed by the injur-
ing party. This development accompanied the broadening of the defi-
nition of negligence liability and the application of overt or covert
forms of strict liability. Second, the system of spreading risks and costs
(externalization) was extended via mandatory private insurance and a
state system of social insurance. 10 The attempt to reconcile this un-
evenly and unsystematically developed jumble of goals and forms of
8. See W. WILHELM, ZUR JURISTISCHEN METHODENLEHRE IM 19. JAHRHUNDVRT
(1958).
9. See G. BROGGEMEIER, ZUR ENTWiCKLUNG DES RECHTS IM OROANISIERTEN
KAPITALISMUS: MATERIALIEN ZUM WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT (1977/1979).
10. LEISNER, SOZIALVERSICHERUNG UND PRIVATVERSICHERUNG. DAROESTgLLT AM
BEISPIEL DER KRANKEN VERSICHERUNG (1974).
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social distribution of damages in law" has gradually become the hall-
mark of modem accident tort law.' 2 The three basic questions of legal
control over societal distribution of risks have been posed anew as so-
cial change compels the continuing development of civil liability law.
In more general terms, we are accustomed to viewing this development
as a shift from formalism to substantialism/materialism in modem
law.
13
The traditional conception of tort law, in both the civil and com-
mon-law traditions, imposes general rules of behavior directed against
each adult member of society. It distributes the risk of personal and
property damage, and in exceptional cases that of economic losses and
so-called noneconomic damages from pain and suffering, among the
parties involved, insofar as they were caused solely by violation of
these rules by unlawful conduct (Unrechtshaftung). German tort law
thus excludes three areas of damage and liability: it regulates neither
liability caused by acts of God or other nonhuman causes (e.g., natural
catastrophes, technical failures) nor liability resulting from dangerous
but legal behavior, and it also ignores breaches of contract and contract
law, in which liability and conduct between the parties involved is in-
trinsically determined by the individual parties. Under liberal nine-
teenth-century tort law, the general risk of accident was shifted from
the victim, who originally bore the risk, to the party who acts culpably
and unlawfully and causes damage (fault liability). In addition to the
cu/pa doctrine, alternative principles of risk distribution such as causa-
tion, endangerment, or equity have been considered only marginally in
German tort law. Outside of the Civil Code, however, modified causal
responsibility was introduced in the form of strict liability
(Gefihrdungshaftung), first in the nineteenth century and strengthened
in the twentieth century through nontort law provisions of special
legislation."
The cu/pa doctrine and the concept of liability for noncontractual
11. That is, fault liability and strict liability, private and social insurance, and interme-
diate elements such as objective negligence liability and private compulsory insurance.
12. H. WEYERS, UNFALLSCHADEN; PRAXIS UND ZIELE VON HAFTPFLICIIT-UND VOR-
SORGESYSTEMEN (1971).
13. Regarding the term "materialization of formal law," see WiethIher, Entiicklung des
Rechtsbegrffs, in RECHTSFORMEN DER VERFLECHTUNG VON STAAT UND WIRTSCIIAFT. 8
JAHRBUCH FOR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE UND RECHTSTHEORIE 38 (Gessner & Winter eds. 1982);
H.D. ASSMANN, G. BRUGGEMEIER, D. HART & C. JOERGES, WIRTSCHAFTSRECIIT ALS KRI-
TIK DES PRIVATRECHTS. BEITRX.GE ZUR PRIVAT-UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECInTSTHEORIE (1980).
14. J. ESSER, GRUNDLAGEN UND ENTWICKLUNG DER GEFXHRDUNGSHAFTUNG (2d ed.
1969). For the point of view of 19th century legal history, see R. OGOREK, UNTER-
SUCHUNGEN ZUR ENTWICKLUNG DER GEFXHRDUNGSHAFTUNG i. 19. JAIRHILJNDERT
1983]
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unlawful conduct (Unrechtshaftung) are thus the two main traditional
criteria of tort law, which developed in the industrializing Germany of
the second half of the nineteenth century. Both criteria, however, have
been increasingly called into question in German tort law development
of the twentieth century. The critical limitation in the area of contract
damages has been modified by the expanding judge-made law develop-
ment of "contract-like" or "quasi-tort" liability (vertragliche Verkehrsp-
flichten). In addition, fault liability has been modified through the
extensive development of one of its most comprehensive areas into a
genuine "objective" negligence liability law. This has been shaded into
covert and overt forms of strict liability through the extension of no-
fault liability for unlawful conduct in the area of the law of unjust en-
richment (Eingrifskondition) and through equity liability in the law of
intellectual property.5
B. Damage Externalization Through Property Rule and
Internalization Through Triple-Tracked Liability Law
The distribution of social risks within an injured party/injuring
party relationship can, as shown, occur in more than one way. Under
the property rule, the injured party may be designated as the original
carrier of risk. Alternatively, the responsibility for damage can regu-
larly or exceptionally be turned over to the injuring party under the
liability rule (Haftungsregel). In the latter situation, the law of damage
compensation is understood as putting the risk upon someone other
than the injured party (Schadensersatzrecht/Haftungsrecht). This law
therefore includes the collected legal rules which form the basis for in-
dividual damage claims under the BGB and other civil and economic
legal provisions as well as judicially developed bases. In other words, it
contains the elements of fault liability for breach of contract and torts
inside and outside of the BGB, specific standards for no-fault liability,
and special legal bases for strict liability (Gefdhrdungshafzung).
A special area of damage law closely connected with tort law is the
so-called Hafipflichtrecht or accident liability law. Usually this is un-
derstood as all legal theories and practices which apportion individual
settlement among the parties in an accident.' 6 Haf/pflichtrecht there-
fore combines both of the central private law principles, tort fault lia-
bility and (nontort) strict liability. Since Josef Esser introduced this
(1975). For the point of view of comparative law, see M. WILL, QUELLEN ERiIItITER
GEFAHR (1980).
15. C. JOERGES, BEREICHERUNGSRECHT ALS WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT (1977),
16. H. WEYERS, supra note 12.
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concept, it has become the practice in Germany to speak of the "two
tracks" of liability law. 17 The extensive and de facto completed inde-
pendence and separation of negligence liability from the intentional
fault liability has led to the concept of the "three tracks" of the law of
damages: (1) fault liability (intent), (2) negligence liability (objective),
and (3) strict liability.'"
1. Principle and Exception-Property Rule and the Rule of
Fault Liability
The original legislative concept of German tort law is familiar to
American students of comparative law. It is the result of four domi-
nant influences in the development of civil law in the nineteenth cen-
tury:' 9 (1) the legal rationalism of the natural-law school (Pufendorf,
Wolff), (2) the moral philosophy of German idealism (Kant, Hegel),
(3) the individualism of economic liberalism (A. Smith), and (4) the
Pandectian jurisprudence of concepts (Savigny, Puchta, Windscheid).
Idealistic moral philosophy and liberal political economy evolved in
Germany from a background of backward, regulated, small-state in-
dustrialization into the social romanticism of a society of craftsmen and
merchants in which prosperous individual citizens who owned the
means of production produced, traded, and entered into contracts
(Sozialmodell des BGB).
20
The consequences for liability law in such an individualistic, lib-
eral economic model of an "atomistic possessive market society""1 was
the basic principle, casum sentit dorninus (let the loss lie where it
falls). 2 The property owner bears the risks for his goods; if he suffers
damage, as a rule he must assume it himself. This is the property rule.
17. Esser, Die Zweispfwigkeit unseres Hafpftichtrechts, 129 JURlsTENzEITUNG [JZ]
(1952).
18. Because of the narrow contact point between objective negligent liability and a strict
liability narrowed by social values, both are sometimes condensed into one class of liability
and contrasted with fault liability (intentional). See E. DEUTSCHI, HAFTUNGSREClirT
ALLGEMEINE LEHREN (1976).
19. See generally F. WIEACKER, PRIVATRECHTSGESCHICHTE DER NEUZEIT (2d d.
1967).
20. F. WIEACKER, DAS SOZIALMODELL DER KLASSISCHEN PRIVATSRECIITS-
GESETZBUCHER UND DIE ENTWICKLUNG DER MODERNEN GESELLSCHAFT (1953): Wicacker.
Das bargerliche Recht im Wandel der Gesellschaftsordnungen, in 2 HUNDERT JAIRE DEUT-
SCHES RECHTSLEBEN; FESTSCHRIFT ZUM HUNDERTJAHRIGEN BESTEHEN DES DEUTSCIlEN
JURISTENTAGES 1 (1960).
21. See C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF PROGRESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM:
HOBBES TO LOCKE (1962).
22. 0. W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 76 (Howe ed. 1963).
19831
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The owner must also bear the costs of damage prevention. The deci-
sion of early industrialism in favor of individual free enterprise, eco-
nomic growth, and technological progress through private initiative
was made at the cost of equitable income distribution and social justice.
It was the property owner's and injured party's affair as the original
riskbearer to insure himself through the purchase of insurance from a
private agent and thus to subsidize the possibly damaging activities of
another. This transfer of the original burden to a third party was made
under the assumption that the risk in question was, technically and le-
gally, insurable.2 3 This shift was then made at a price (insurance pre-
mium) based on the expected worth of the damage risks and so made
possible a profitable risk distribution by the insurer. Since the possibil-
ity of private insurance enabled distribution of damage among injured
parties, no social incentive for damage protection was created.
Whether for the reason of economic efficiency or from the stand-
point of the prevailing responsibility ethic, there followed a partial cor-
rection of the principle casum sentit dominus through tort law. The
misuse of freedom to the detriment of another, a morally reproachable
and culpable causation of the damage, should legally obligate the
damager to compensate for such damage. Fault was viewed as the re-
sponsibility of the will. 24 Given intent and negligence, in other words,
the conscious failure to exercise the required degree of care in transac-
tions which contain a foreseeable danger, tort law shifted the risk of
loss to the injuring party. To burden financially the entrepreneur with
a more widely ranging responsibility based on causation or equity (es-
pecially for traffic and work accident victims in an environment which
had become increasingly dangerous as a result of industrialization) was
regarded in Germany, as in the United States, England, and France, as
restraint of the economic initiative of the individual. It was therefore
considered detrimental to the national economy in international com-
petition. "If we go any further [from fault to the causation principle]
• . ., in no way will the development of trade be served, but rather the
initiative of the individual will be excessively restricted.' ' 25
The substantial concurrence of natural law, idealism, and liberal
economic doctrines on this point elevated the cu/pa doctrine in the sec-
ond half of the nineteenth century to the status of a quasi-natural law
by the jurisprudence of concepts. "Damage does not require indemni-
23. See L. STOCKBAUER, VERSICHERUNG UND WIRTSCHAFTSORDNUNG (1978).
24. R. VON IHERING, DAS SCHULDMOMENT IM ROMISCHEN PRIVATRECtIT (1867).
25. II Protokolle der Kommission ftur die zweite. Lesung des Entwurfs des Bargerlichen
Gesetzbuches 569 (1898) [hereinafter cited as Prot. II].
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fication but fault does. A simple sentence, just as simple as that of the
axiom of the chemist, that it's not the light that bums, but rather the
oxygen in the air."
26
By protecting the integrity of the "possessive individual"
(Marktbitrger) in a key area, for example, his life, bodily integrity, free-
dom (habeas corpus guarantee), and property, tort law was to guaran-
tee the market-economy as a model of economic development through
private individual economic decisions. Just as criminal law attempted
to do this through the penalization of deviant social behavior, the nine-
teenth-century tort law, by modifying the legal actions based on the
Roman Lex Aquilia,27 attempted to reach this goal through the imposi-
tion of a liability risk upon the party at fault. This process required
balancing protection of individual freedom against misuse of individ-
ual freedom.
Limiting the liability of the injuring party only to culpably caused
damage was, however, still further weakened in two respects. A claim
could only be made upon the culpable party if the injured party could
prove the fault of the injuring party (burden of proof of the victim as to
the fault of the injuring party); and, in addition, even after this had
been proven, if the damage risks were insurable (business liability in-
surance) and therefore transferable.28
Apart from the historical exceptions of damage by wild life 9 and
liability for owners of domestic animals,30 the fault principle in the tort
law of the German civil code was consistently carried through. An es-
pecially extreme and, in its social consequences, disastrous formulation
was the lack of individual vicarious fault liability in section 83 1.3 1 In
26. R. VON IHERING, supra note 24, at 40. See also Prot. II, supra note 25, at 585.
27. H. HAUSMANIGER, DAS SCHADENSERSATZRECHT DER LEx AGUIALI (2d ed. 1980).
28. This categorization of insurance premiums as a fixed cost of production, in accord-
ance with the basic tenets of the microeconomic liberal model here, all other factors being
held constant, led to social production being carried out at the lowest possible level of risk.
The assignment of liability risks thus leads to a minimization of social damage. V. MATAJA,
DAs REcHT DES SCHADENSERSATZES VOM STANDPUNKT DER NATIONALUKONOMIE (1888).
For a more recent work see Posner, A Theory ofNegligence, I J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
For a critique of the latter, see Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toxwrd a Testfor Strict Liabilit', in
Torts, 81 YALE LJ. 1055 (1972).
29. BGB § 835.
30. Id. § 833.
31. See II MOTIVE ZU DEM ENTwURF EINES BORGERLICHEN GESETZBUCIIS FOR DAS
DEUTSCHE REcHT 736-37 (1888) [hereinafter cited as MOTIVE]; Prot. II, supra note 25, at
603, notes:
The proposals [for the extension of entrepreneur liability] contain a legitimate
element insofar as they rest upon the principle that those who enjoy the advantages
of an undertaking must also take responsibility for damages to a third party which
1983]
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this way, industrial enterprises were set free from tort liability to third
parties and to employees.32 The consequent social costs of this legisla-
tive decision conforming to the cu/pa doctrine were offset in part
through special legal provisions of strict liability and tightened fault
liability33 and in part by means of social insurance.34 The individual
liability of public administrators for culpable dereliction of duty has
been extended to liability by the state since the Weimar Republic.
3"
Even traditional cases of tort liability for breach of legal duties of care
and protection (Verkehrssicherungsflichten)36 for which the laws of the
nineteenth century already had found a no-fault liability were reinte-
grated into fault liability by easing the burden of proof. The only ex-
ample of liability without fault was the liability of incompetent but
affluent persons.37
2. Differentiations of Fault Liability
The two rationales for fault liability law--economic liberalism and
the ethic of individual responsibility-lost credibility as the relation-
ship between state and society in Germany changed at the end of the
nineteenth century. 38 The result was a multifaceted erosion of the
cu/pa doctrine. A short explanation of this loss of credibility will
suffice.
An undifferentiated definition of fault liability, which treated in-
tentional and negligent behavior jointly, became untenable as develop-
ing industrial technology boosted the number of accidental damage
cases. Accident injury law was the first area to lay down definite
grounds for a genuine negligence liability law. Accidents in the work-
place were treated from the beginning under social insurance and strict
arise out of it. But this principle cannot be realized within the framework of the
German civil code.
32. As to third parties, this was a deviation from the French and Anglo-American legal
situation which presumed strict liability for entrepreneurial acts. See art. 1384, 3 of the
French civil code (respondeat superior doctrine). As to employees, the limit of liability was
similar to the legal situation in comparable western industrial countries, especially the
United States.
33. See, e.g., Reichshaftpflichtgesetz of 1871, 1871 Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBI] 207 (W.
Ger.).
34. See, e.g., the Compulsory Workmen's Compensation by the Accident Insurance
Law (Unfallversicherungsgesetz) of July 7, 1884, 1884 RGB 1 69 (W. Ger.).
35. See BGB § 839 in conjunction with WEIMARER REICHSVERFASSUNG art. 131 (Ger-
man Constitution of 1919); GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 34 (W. Ger.).
36. For example, the guardian's obligation (BGB § 832) or liability for the collapse of a
building (BGB § 836).
37. BGB § 829 (Richesse Oblege).
38. G. BROGGEMEER, supra note 9 (1977).
[Vol. 6
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liability law, outside of tort law. Owners of technical installations were
compelled to assume special risks for high technology under specific
rules of strict liability. Consideration was given for safety measures
required by technological development by formulating uniform indus-
trial standards.3 9 Provisions for the prevention of accidents and pollu-
tion, which were interpreted in part as statutes designed to protect
another' and in part as mere definitions of required standards of con-
duct, were also promulgated. A judicially sanctioned transfer of the
burden of proof onto the shoulders of the tortfeasor when a protective
statute had been violated was developed as an additional means of in-
suring industrial safety. Control of the remaining areas of social risks
was "resolved" within the framework of BGB-tort law through judi-
cially imposed legal duties of care (Verkehrspflchten).4 t Often rigid ex
post facto requirements as to proper conditions led to a mingling of
negligence and strict liability. As early as the 1940's, J. Esser and A.
Ehrenzweig, Jr. referred to this tendency as "quasi-torts" 4 and "negli-
gence without fault."43 As is well known, judicial precedents similarly
"amended" BGB section 831, which limits respondeat superior
(1) through the introduction of an entrepreneurial duty to provide an
organization that will ensure the safe operation of the enterprise (Or-
ganisationspflicht) within the framework of section 823, paragraph 1;
(2) through the broadened definition of "directors of an organization or
body" originally set forth in sections 30, 31, and 89; and (3) by impos-
ing safety responsibilities on municipal, bodies as legal persons under
public law to provide for general safety of, for example, public paths
and canals, under section 823, paragraph 1 (violation of enumerated
legal interests such as life and bodily integrity), following similar shifts
legally provided for in sections 832 and 836. These legal precedents
have had the greatest impact in the areas of products liability and med-
ical malpractice.
3. Strict Liability (Gefdhrdungshaftung)
The dominance and supposed universality of the ctdua doctrine in
private damage compensation and tort law meant that alternative dam-
age distribution principles, such as causation or endangerment, only
39. Deutsches Institut fir Normung e.V. -DIN.
40. Schutzgesetz, in the sense of BGB § 823, 1 2.
41. See C. VON BAR, VERKEHRSPFLICHTEN: RiCHTERLICHE GEFAIIRSTEUERUNGS-
GEBOTE IM DEUTSCHEN DELIKTSRECHT (1980).
42. J. ESSER, supra note 14, at 106.
43. Ehrenzweig, Loss Shifting and Quasi-Negligence. 8 U. CHi. L REv. 729 (1941).
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came into play through specific legislative acts in cases where rapid
technical advances had rendered their application especially necessary.
The creation of a national railroad system, increasing automobile traf-
fic, the development of air traffic, the extension of electricity and gas
works, the introduction of large scale pharmaceutical production, and
the development of peaceful applications for atomic energy are all ex-
amples of such special cases." Thus, no-fault strict liability, as a weak-
ened form of absolute liability, is still restricted to specific technical
areas of damage control.
Section 25 of the Prussian Railroad Act of 1838 which imposes
strict liability on the railroad for freight damage and personal injury to
passengers and employees, was the first such statute and remains the
prototype for a strict liability clause:
The corporation must compensate for all damages which take
place in the course of the railway's operation, whether these damages
be to passengers or freight, or to other persons and their property.
The corporation is only relieved of this responsibility if it proves that
the injury was the fault of the injured party, or that it was caused by
unavoidable outside circumstances.
4 5
The provisions regarding personal injuries were taken over from sec-
tion 25 of the Prussian Railroad Act into section 1 of the Reichshafl-
pflichtgesetz of 187 1.46 Another provision, section 2 of the same act,
made the entrepreneur strictly liable only for deaths and personal inju-
ries caused by the culpability of his executives.
47
In Germany, the extent of strict liability was successively extended
to such disparate areas as: the Motor Vehicles Act (1909), an Air Traf-
fic Act (1922), the Liability of Trains and Streetcars Act (1940)," an
Act amending the Reichshaftpfqichtgesetz which concerned personal
and property injuries caused by electricity or gas installations (1943), a
Water Utility Act (1957), an Atomic Energy Act (1959/1975), and the
44. See infra note 49.
45. 1838 Preussisehe Gesetzessammlung 505, 510.
46. Reichshaflpffichtgesetz § 1 (1871) (an act treating the entrepreneurial obligation to
compensate for any deaths or personal injuries incurred in the operation of railroads, mines,
factories, quarries, and excavations).
47. Comparable liability provisions for railroad firms, the pioneers of industrialization,
were first enacted in the United States for passengers in Massachusetts in 1840, and for
railroad employees in Georgia in 1850. The Federal Employer's Liability Act was enacted
in 1908. See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 403, 419-35 (1973).
48. This last act is the so-called Sachschadenshaftpflichtgesetz, which brought property
damages in this area under strict liability in state law; such damages have been ignored in
the Reichshaftpflichtgesetz of 1871.
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Pharmaceutical Act (1961/1976)." 9
These individual classes of strict liability have so much in com-
mon, despite their different origins and the different issues which they
treat, that one can speak of a genuine principle of strict liability like
tort fault liability. This strict liability is another independent "track" of
Haftpflichtrecht5 0 Such a strict liability, as defined by Kdtz in 1970,
concerns itself with the liability placed upon those "whose businesses,
installations or materials constitute a special source of danger.'' 1 The
public policy behind the choice of this liability principle is based upon
the following considerations:
The decisive factor in the increase of liability is the observation
that in modem society, which has been decisively influenced by tech-
nological development, certain occupations and conditions have be-
come indispensable. They must therefore be sanctioned, although a
certain amount of danger and possible damage to third parties can-
not be totally avoided, despite the application of due care. Any per-
son who, fully conscious of the risks involved, chooses to bring about
a dangerous condition or installation, must also be prepared to com-
pensate for any damages which this might entail, independently of
whether fault can be proven in every case. The proprietor of such a
company is indeed the most appropriate person to assume such a
responsibility, as he or she is in the best position to judge the risks
and to provide for possible injuries, especially through insurance.
52
One should therefore distinguish the elements of strict liability from
two neighboring areas, negligence and absolute liability. In contrast to
negligence liability, strict liability applies explicitly to businesses with
inherently high risks of injury. Negligence liability covers occupation-
ally-related risks which, at any stage of technological and scientific de-
velopment can usually be controlled through necessary organizational,
security, or preventive measures. To a certain extent, one can say that
strict liability arises upon the creation of a source of danger, and that
liability for negligence then arises once this danger is considered to be
avoidable or controllable.53 Because of the vagueness of these criteria
(e.g., "susceptible to control," "state of the art") the boundary between
49. For citations to these special acts, see Brlggemeier, jupra note 4, at 398-99.
50. See supra text accompanying note 17.
51. K6tz, Haftwgfr Besondere Gefahr, 170 AcP 1, 21 (1970).
52. Justification for the Proposal to Amend the Law of Damages of Dec. 19, 1975-
Bundesrats-Drucksache 777/75, at 7.
53. E. DEUTSCH, supra note 18, at 366; Mertens, Verkehrspflichten und Delikisrecht -
Gedanken ztu einer Dogmnatik der Verkehrspflichtverletzung, 1980 VERSlCHERUtNGSREt-cT
[VERsR] 397, 405.
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these two kinds of liability must always remain somewhat murky, and
therefore a twilight zone of strict liability masquerading as negligence
liability cannot be eliminated.
The other field from which strict liability is to be distinguished is
absolute liability. A necessary, but not alone sufficient, precondition
for the imposition of liability on the entrepreneur/corporation is the
causation of damage by that business. An additional precondition in
all types of strict liability has so far been a public policy evaluation of
the basis for and extent to which the risk of damage should be borne by
the injuring party. This "social evaluation" is especially concerned
with five points:54
(1) "use and control" or the extent to which the risk bearer can
influence conditions, installations, and materials;
(2) the societal pressure to accept risks, in the sense of the una-
voidability of contact with the dangerous installations, conditions,
and materials in question;
(3) liability only for risks which are typical or inherent in an under-
taking (this can result in the exclusion of liability for unavoidable
events and "Acts of God");
(4) an appraisal of the conduct of the injured party (contributory
negligence within the meaning of section 254); and
(5) limitation of damage compensation according to the type of in-
jury (as a rule only for economically measurable damages to persons
and property; there is no compensation for nonmaterial pain and suf-
fering) and a ceiling on damage recovery.
55
In 1967, the West German Justice Department's fourth draft of a
statute to alter and expand damages compensation saw as its "first es-
sential task" the closing of gaps in special statutory strict liability. To
this end, these special statutes were in principle to be retained, and in
the main, the Reichshaftpfqichtgesetz of 1871 was to be expanded to in-
clude several new elements. This proposal remained in the planning
stage. The most essential developments in this area are instead embod-
ied in the Act to Change the Legal Provisions for Compensation of
August 16, 1977,56 which contained two critical points: elevation of le-
gal ceilings for strict liability and extension of the provisions for strict
liability into new areas.
54. See R. LUKES, REFORM DER PRODUKTHAFTUNO 102 (1979).
55. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
56. 1977 BUJNDESGESETZBLATr, Teil 1 [BGBI] 1577 (W. Ger.). On this occasion, the
Reichshaftpflichtgesetz and the Sachschadensgesetz were merged into the Haflpflichtgesctz
of Apr. 1, 1978, 1978 BGBI 145 (W. Ger.).
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One finds in current academic literature57 an alternative to special
statutory strict liability: scholars have faced the double problem of
(1) adjusting liability law to technological development, while
(2) avoiding systematically overtaxing the BGB tort law by forcing
strict liability cases under negligence liability. The solution has been
the development of a general clause of strict liability for technological
risks and/or special dangers.5 8 In other respects, this solution was pro-
posed as early as 1950 as a guiding principle for the reform of liability
law.59 The critical problem in this reform of strict liability has been
examination and revision of the social criteria which have previously
limited liability. These are principally: liability exemptions, protected
classes of individuals, contributory fault, statutory ceilings on maxi-
mum liability, and the refusal to recognize damages for nonmaterial
pain and suffering (Schmerzensgeld).
II. STRUCTURE AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE OF THE
BGB TORT LAW: A TYPICAL EXAMPLE OF
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN
LIABILITY LAW IN WESTERN
INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS
The tort law of the German Civil Code, characterized by liability
for noncontractual unlawful behavior and by the individual responsi-
bility ethic of the cu/pa doctrine, was the product of an industrializing
society and of the jurisprudence of concepts (Begrifst'irisprndenz) in
Germany in the second half of the nineteenth century. The prevailing
social-political image at mid-century was the social model of the "at-
omistic possessive market society." In the German empire during the
Great Depression of 1873-1895, the credibility of this model was mark-
edly reduced. Yet in the great codifications--especially the "delayed
BGB"--it remained the predominant frame of orientation.' For the
drafters of the BGB, the externalization of damage to the injured party,
was, as we have seen, the main solution to the problem of the social
distribution of risks in a society which was experiencing a severe struc-
57. See Kotz, supra note 51; E. VON CAEMMERER, REFORM DER
GEFXHRDUNGSHAFTUNG (1971); E. DEUTSCH, supra note 18, at 382; Kotz, Gefdhrdungshof-
tung, in GUTACHTEN UND VORSCHLXGE ZUR OBERARBEITUNG DES SCHULDRECRTS 1781
(Federal Ministry of Justice ed. 1981).
58. Id.
59. GRUNDFRAGEN DER REFORM DES SCHADENSERSATZREcHTS 12, 16 (Nipperdey cd.
1940) [hereinafter cited as GRUNDFRAGEN DER REFoRM].
60. See generally F. WmACKER, supra note 20.
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tural change. When the alteration of the scope of the property rule
proved unavoidable, however, BGB tort law introduced an exceptional
shifting of risk onto the injuring party, to provide for those noncontrac-
tual areas not covered by the law of damages. This was necessary if the
social model was in reality to be kept efficient and workable and/or
true to the basic postulates of the prevailing social ethic. The concrete
formation of tort law in BGB sections 823 to 853 is quite decidedly
determined by this social model of the liberal market and contract soci-
ety and the thus postulated self-regulating market economy, based on
private individual economic decisions. The legislative concept of BGB
tort law is characterized by six attributes: (1) a dichotomy between
contract and tort; (2) a system of single liability clauses instead of a
general clause; (3) concentration upon the "absolute subjective right";
(4) lack of a material concept of unlawfulness; (5) uniform concept of
individual-subjective culpability; and (6) restriction of judicial
discretion.
The actual socio-economic development of the capitalistic indus-
trial societies, and especially of that in Germany following the Great
Depression of 1873-1895 and the second chemical and electrical indus-
trial revolution, underwent crises and a process of concentration which
placed the basic institutions of the contract and market model in ques-
tion. In place of the tendency of the economy to be independent from
the polity-state, an "organized interdependence" developed.6" This
had a considerable effect upon liberal German tort law as well. The six
mentioned attributes of the legislative tort law concept were under-
mined by decisive structural and functional changes. Although the ear-
lier tort principle is unchanged in the written statutes, today the basic
principle of the internalization of damage upon the injuring party is at
the forefront of judicial practice.
A. Dichotomy Between Contract and Tort Law and the
Development of the Contract-Like Liability
The BGB's obligation law, in principle, recognizes fault liability
only for breach of contractual commitments (ex contractu) and tortious
behavior (ex deliclu). This fault liability concept is supplemented by
several special compensation rules, 62 such as liability for "reliance
61. H.J. MERTENS, C. KIRCHNER& E. SCHANZE, WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 65 (1978);see G.
BROGGEMEIER, supra note 9.
62. In the common law tradition these rules are usually called obligaiiones quasi ex
delictu.
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damages,"6 3 liability of thefalsusprocurator,6 and liability of the agent
of necessity.6" It is further supplemented by the objective value trans-
fer sections of the unjust enrichment law, the contract related action
based on a benefit conferred (Leistungskondition), and the tort related
action based on interference (Eingrffiskondition).
The differences between contractual liability and tort liability in
the BGB manifest themselves in six central areas: (1) contractual lia-
bility permits the liquidation of purely economic losses, while tort lia-
bility does not;66 (2) contract law recognizes vicarious liability;67
(3) contract law places the general burden of proof upon the injuring
party to prove himself or herself not culpable,68 while tort law does not;
(4) contract law provides for a residual statute of limitations of thirty
years,69 tort law for three years;70 (5) only tort law provides for dam-
ages for pain and suffering;' 1 and (6) the possibility of limiting liability
by agreement is narrower in tort law than in contract law. The first
four of these distinctions represent advantages of contractual liability
for the plaintiff and the last two significant disadvantages.
The discrepancy between contractual and tort liability must have
appeared questionable as judges began to correct the rules on loss dis-
tribution contained in the BGB-obligation law soon after the BGB
came into force on January 1, 1900. The result was a variety of ap-
proaches adjusting tort liability towards contractual liability: (1) the
expansion of the scope of section 826 (contra bonos mores), through the
reduction of its requirements for proof of intent, to make possible a
broader protection for purely economic losses; (2) circumvention of
section 831 (lack of vicarious liability) and establishment of nondelega-
ble duties to provide a safe organization for enterprises under section
823, paragraph 1; (3) easing the burden of proof of fault (e.g., prima
facie, res ipsa loquitur).
While these approaches to the expansion of tort liability remained
within the formal boundaries of a tort law strictly delineated from con-
tract law, the evolution of a contract-like liability (vertragliche
63. BGB §§ 122, 309.
64. Id. § 179.
65. Id. § 687.
66. Exceptions to this rule are found in § 823, 12, "statute designed to protect another"
§ 824, "endangerment of credit;" § 826, contra bonos mores; and § 839, state liability.
67. BGB § 278.
68. Id. § 282.
69. Id. § 195.
70. Id. § 852.
71. Id. § 847.
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Verkehrspflichten)72 openly blended together tort law and contract law.
This tendency, which has also occurred in United States common law,
has been referred to epigrammatically as "contorts" by G. Gilmore.1
3
The judiciary in Germany has developed contract-like liability for in-
dividual types of cases in different historical steps through different
doctrinal forms. In this way, it worked to integrate these new liability
forms into the traditional doctrinal structures, seeking to retain the ba-
sic principles of the civil law-especially the separation of contract and
tort-which have been brought into question by these same judicial
decisions. Today, the following main types of cases of contract-like or
quasi-tort liability can be distinguished:
1) The classical cases of tort duties to provide for general safety
of buildings, streets, etc., imposed upon a proprietor or entrepreneur
(Verkehrssicherungspflichten der Sachhalter), which are subsumed by
cupa in contrahendo ,4 and to which contract law thus applies (I e., vi-
carious tort liability despite section 831, extension of the three year stat-
ute of limitations in section 852).75
2) The basic cases incorporating third parties into the scope of
protection of a contract. This was done at first through suitable appli-
cation of the concept of third party beneficiary contracts (fVertrag
zugunsten Dritter, section 328);76 and after 1960 by applying the
formula of a "contract which functions to protect third parties" (Ver-
trag mit Schutzwirkungftr Dritte).77 This contractual liability was orig-
inally restricted in two respects: the scope of damage compensation
was limited to personal and property damages; and the category of
72. A formula used by the West German Federal Supreme Court of Civil Jurisdiction,
the Bundesgerichtshaf, Judgment of Feb. 15, 1978, Bundesgerichtshof, 1978 Wertpapier-
Mitteilungen [WM] 515.
73. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 90 (1974).
74. Kessler & Fine, Cupa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith and Freedom of
Contract, 77 HARV. L. REV. 401 (1964). For recent commentary in Germany see H. STOLL,
TATBESTANDE UND FUNKTIONEN DER HAFTUNG FOR CULPA IN CONTRAHENDO in FEsT-
SCHRIFT FOR VON CAEMMERER 433 (1978); and Medicus, Verschulden bei Vertragsverhan-
d/ungen, in I GUTACHTEN UND VORSCHLAGE ZUR OBERARBEITUNG DES SCtULDREC|ITS
479 (Federal Ministry of Justice ed. 1981).
75. That is, there is vicarious tort liability despite BGB § 831, and the three year statute
of limitations in § 852 is extended. See the following classic cases: Judgment of Dec. 7,
1911, Reichsgericht, 78 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES REICHSGERICHT IN ZIVILZACHIEN [RGZ 239
(linoleum case); Judgment of Sept 26, 1961, Bundesgerichtshof, 1962 NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 31 (banana peel case); Judgment of Jan. 28, 1976, Bundesgcricht-
shof, 66 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOF IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] 51, 1976 JZ
776 (cu/pa in contrahendo used to protect third parties).
76. See Judgment of April 14, 1930, Reichsgericht, 128 RGZ 218 (gas meter case),
77. Judgment of May 15, 1959, Bundesgerichtshof, 1959 NJW 1676 (Capuzol case).
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beneficiaries was restricted to those persons to whom recognizable du-
ties of care and protection were owed by a person whose services had
been engaged.7" Liability is being increasingly extended beyond these
restrictions, however, to cover purely economic losses, for example ex-
tending protection to a third party in the cases of attorney-client con-
tracts.7 9 The category of beneficiaries was extended to include persons
other than those to whom recognizable duties of care and protection
are owed.80
3) The justification of contractual liability by means of "implied
warranty" or "the fiction of separate consulting, information and guar-
antee contracts."81
4) The contractual liability of proxies which has since then been
generalized to cover various forms of de facto participation in business
transactions under the title of "agent liability" (Sachnwalterhaftung).2
This includes liability for the reliability of information given out by a
paid professional.
8 3
These cases have in common the fact that if any common and rec-
78. See Judgment of Jan. 22, 1968, Bundesgerichtshof, 49 BGHZ 350; 51 BGHZ 91, 95,
pur Wohl und Wehe verantworilich (1969); Judgment of Sept. 19, 1973, Bundesgerichshof, 61
BGHZ 227.
79. For example, extending protection to a third party in cases of attorney-client con-
tracts. See also Judgment of July 6, 1965, Bundesgerichshof, 1965 NJW 1955 (last will case);
Bundesgerichshof, 1977 NJW 2073 (divorce settlement case).
80. Judgment of Feb. 28, 1977, Bundesgerichshof, 69 BGHZ 82 (bank debit procedure
case); Judgment of Nov. 12, 1979, Bundesgerichshof, 75 BGHZ 321 (Publikunsgesrellschaft-
GmbH & Co. KG).
81. Implied warranty: Judgment of June 21, 1967, Bundesgerichshof, 48 BGHZ 118,
1967 NJW 1903 TREVIRA; Judgment of July 5, 1972, Bundesgerichshof, 59 BGHZ 158,
1972 NJW 1706 (Brawnf-aule); Judgment of June 25, 1975, Bundesgerichshof, 1975 NJW
1693 (used car mileage); Consulting contract: Judgment of Feb. 8, 1978, Bundesgerichshof,
70 BGHZ 356 (1978); Judgment of Mar. 22, 1979, Bundesgerichshof, 74 BGHZ 103 (1979);
Information contract: Bundesgerichshof, 1979 NJW 1595; Guarantee contract: Judgment of
June 28, 1979, Bundesgerichshof, 75 BGHZ 75, 1979 NJW 2036 (Isolarglas); Judgment of
Nov. 12, 1980, Bundesgerichshof, 78 BGHZ 369, 1981 NJW 275 (Ford).
82. Judgment of Sept. 17, 1954, Bundesgerichshof, 14 BGHZ 313; see Ballerstedt, Zur
Haflung far culpa in contrahendo bei Geschaftsabsclu4 durch Stellverreter, 151 AcP 501
(1950-51).
83. Judgment of Apr. 5, 1971, Bundesgerichshof, 56 BGHZ 81, 1971 NJW 1309. Judg-
ment of Dec. 19, 1977, Bundesgerichshof, 70 BGHZ 337, 1978 NJW 1374. For subdivisions
thereof, see Judgment of Jan. 21, 1975, Bundesgerichshof, 63 BGHZ 382, 1975 NJW 642;
Bundesgerichshof, 1981 NJW 992 (liability of a used car dealer acting as proxy); Judgment
of Oct. 6, 1980, Bundesgerichshof, 79 BGHZ 337; 1982 NJW 1514 (liability for an invest-
ment prospectus). For the prospectus liability, doctrinally construed as cases of cu/pa in
contrahendo, see generally Schwark, Die Haftung aus dem Prospekn Ober Kapitalanlagen. 34
BETRIEBS-BERATER [BB] 897 (1979); Coing, Haflung aus Prospektwerbundftr Kapfralanlagen
in der neuren Rechtsprechung des Bundesgerichtshofes, 1980 WM 20.
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ognizable legal interests of a third party would be affected and are not
already covered by some contractual relationship, the risks inherent in
business activities are internalized as professional duties and responsi-
bilities of the acting party. These professional duties of reasonable care
and protection are distinguished as "contractual duties without a con-
tract" (vertragliche Verkehrs/Berufspflichten ).84 First, these duties are
distinguished because these cases are almost exclusively limited to busi-
ness contacts (in either a broad or narrow sense), and second, because it
was intended that a liability standard which the BGB had reserved for
contractual liability would be made available8 5
The "contractual duties without a contract" postulate duties of
care (1) for cases of business contacts outside the narrow contract rela-
tionship with its reciprocal primary and secondary performance obliga-
tions based on the bargain and independent of the creation or existence
of privity of contract (cases of protection or liability of third parties).
Typically, the "contractual duties without a contract" demarcate a pro-
tected area in the social framework of an intended business transaction
or the execution of a contract and relate to the actual activities of a
property owner or agent. This is the basic distinction from the genuine
area of liability resulting from cu/a in contrahendo, positive breach of
contract (positive Vertragsverletzung), and breach of postcontractual
duties. These types of liability are to be restricted to violations by the
negotiating or contracting parties of performance obligations related to
the bargain. The central aspect is violation of promises to perform and
disappointment of expectations one has encouraged through his own
contractual or contract-like 6 assumption of performance duties (status
ad quem) and thus is a matter of contract law. Liability "without a
contract" involves interference with the status quo unrelated to a bar-
84. See Judgment of Mar. 23, 1921, Reichsgericht, 102 RGZ 38, and Judgment of July
7, 1921, Reichsgericht, 102 RGZ 372. While there is no obligation imposed upon each citi-
zen to protect the interests of another, anyone whose profession necessarily entails some
danger (in this case, a veterinarian), and who provides a service to the public, must assume
the responsibility
in those areas where his or her services are made use of, that things be in an orderly
manner. A profession or occupation of this type entails generally appropriate spe-
cial legal duties of care, which in a broader sense can be designated as duties en-
tailed in the operation of a business (Verkehrspflichten).
102 RGZ 372, at 375.
85. E.g., vicarious liability (BGB § 278), burden of proof (§ 282), statute of limitations
(§ 195), or compensation for primary economic loss.
86. For a theory of "contract-like obligation" by transaction-related conduct, see J.
K6NDGEN, SELBSTBINDUNG OHNE VERTRAG. ZUR HAFTUNG AUS GESCHAFTSBEZOoavNEM
HANDELN (1981).
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-gain, and improper conduct in transagendo involving violation of more
general rules of conduct, for example, the judge-made duties of con-
duct. This is thus functionally tort law.
(2) In addition, there must be a socially recognized protected re-
lationship. The recognition of a duty of protection is greatly dependent
upon the common perception of an economically efficient and/or so-
cially just distribution of damages, which itself is affected by socio-eco-
nomic change. This evaluation of a social interest forms the basis for
the requisite duties which would serve to protect this interest. Both the
evaluation of an interest as worthy of protection and the formulation of
appropriate duties of conduct for its protection were recognized by the
judiciary in the various cases of contract-like liability under the broad
heading of good faith.87
The unified doctrinally construed basis for contract-like duties of
care and protection is to be found in a legally protected relationship
(gesetzliches Schutzpflichtverhiiltnis)88 rather than in cu/pa contrahendo,
third-party beneficiary, and implied or constructive contracts. This le-
gally protected relationship, despite the contentions of Canaris and
others,8 9 has no place in contract law, for example, as a contract-like
privity, analogous to cu/pa in contrahendo. In this relationship, as has
been mentioned, neither the basis nor the consequences of liability are
"contractual." Only the viability standard is contractual. ° The duties
of conduct imposed upon certain persons in certain situations to take
measures of reasonable care and protection are independent of the
existence of any individual privity of contract. There can be no con-
tractual claims for any performance based on these duties. If someone
87. BGB § 242. The lack of vicarious liability in § 831 was judicially corrected. Rules
treating the burden of proof (res 0psa loquitur and prima facie) were relaxed. The concept of
"reliance liability" was introduced where one seemingly in authority had been consulted
(Vertrauens/Sachwalter/Erkliirungschaftung). On the concept of "reliance liability," see
C.W. CANARIS, DIE VERTRAUENSHAFTUNG IM DEUTSCHEN PRIVATRECHT (1971); M.
BOHRER, DIE HAFTUNG DES DISPOSITIONSGARANTEN (1980); E. ScHdirr, DRITrHAFTUNG
AUS CULPA IN CONTRAHENDO (1980); Grunewald, Zur Harfung tan Fachleuten im Ziilrecht-
sverkehr, 1982 JZ 627.
88. See Canaris, Ansprtche wegen 'oositiver Vetragsrerlet.ung" und "Schut.wn'irkungfir
Dritte"beinichtigen Vertrigen, 1965 JZ 475; Stoll,Abschied ron der Lehre derpositiken Ver-
tragsverletzung, 136 AcP 257 (1932); Haupt, Uberfaktische VertragserhdlMnisrse. in 2 FEST-
SCHRIFT SIBER 1 (1941-43); and D1lle, Aul3ergesetziiche Schuldflichien, 103 ZErrsCRIFr
FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT 67 (1943). Following Canaris. see K. LARENZ.
LEHRBUCH DES SCHULDRECHTS §§ 9(1), 17(111) (13th ed. 1982); M. LEHMANN, VERTRAG-
SANBAIHNUNG DURCH WERBUNG (1981).
89. Canaris' concept embraces a notion of privity-like relationship governed by contract
law, but providing only duties to protect the other party-not contractual duties to perform.
90. See BGB §§ 195, 278, 282, and compensation for economic losses.
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comes into contact with a third party, however, whether in his or her
own interests or in the fulfillment of business duties, then he or she runs
the possible risk of assuming damage compensation costs if he or she,
objectively viewed, discernably affects outside interests by a perform-
ance of duties which falls below a reasonable standard of care or
competence.
If, however, these "contractual duties without a contract" consist
of duties of care and conduct to protect specific legal interests in spe-
cific situations, then these duties are actually applications of the tort
principle.91
This is not the general tort law, as set out in section 823 and the
following sections, but, instead, special tort law (Sonderdeliktsrecht). It
serves to protect individual safety through judicial formulation of pro-
fessional and protective duties. These duties do not apply generally to
everyone, but rather only to specific broad or narrow areas of society,
for example, products liability, medical malpractice liability, prospec-
tus liability, and liability for information provided. Compared with
this special tort law, "the path to contract law leads into fictions." 92 It
is therefore preferable to treat the categories of contract-like liability as
cases of tort liability in special relationships. This is on the condition
that in addition to the existing advantages of tort liability93 the four
goals of contract-like liability (liquidation of purely economic losses,
vicarious liability, shift of the burden of proof of fault, and a long stat-
ute of limitations) can be achieved within this broader framework of
special tort law. With the exception of the statute of limitations, this
has to some extent already occurred and can be further developed
through judge-made law.
94
The formulation of such "contractual duties without a contract"
restricts the individual's economic freedom by compelling him or her to
assume a liability risk which originates outside of any contract in order
to establish certain standards of care and protection in business trans-
91. The attorney-client cases, supra note 79, are to be distinguished in that the interests
involved are not status quo interests but are instead expectations of acquiring assets. The
question therefore arises whether tort law is not conceptually overtaxed and whether it is in
fact contract or contract-like.
92. S. Simitis, 2 Papers & Proceedings of the 47th German Lawyers' Conference M 125
(Deutscher Juristentag 1969).
93. E.g., damages for pain and suffering and limitations on the exclusion of liability in
cases of personal injury or invasion of privacy.
94. See C. VON BAR, supra note 41, at 239; von Bar Vertragliche Schadensersatzpflichten
ohne Vertrag?, 1982 JURISTISCHE SCHULUNG 637. In the field of German products liability,
see Brtoggemeier, Die Produzentenhaftung gemit3 § 823 abs. 1, 1982 WM 1294.
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actions. The judicial socialization of the risks entailed in social inter-
course via the recognition of professional and business transactional
duties, that is, the transition from self-regulation to social regulation in
business conduct, has thus acted to reconcile the conflict between the
state's requirement for corrective justice and the requirements of eco-
nomic efficiency.95
B. The System of Individual Tort Clauses vs. a General Clause
Roman law and German Gemeines Recht did not contain, and
modem Anglo-American common law still does not contain, a general
concept of tort. Cases of tort liability were not governed by a general
clause, but rather were regulated in specific individual classes of ac-
tions. By contrast, the modem codifications of the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries are primarily based on a unified concept of tort, the
unlawful and culpable violation of legally protected interests. These
codes are also based on a general basic rule of tort liability, in which
the unlawful, culpable causation of damage makes the injuring party
liable.96
The unified conception of tort law pervaded the first proposal for
the German Civil Code. Later revisions and amendments of this draft
replaced this concept with the well known system of individual tort
clauses which has been substantially restored to its original condition9
through the tedious process of judicial development of law.
The first partial draft of a German Civil Code in 1882
(Teilentwurf) proposed, in agreement with "all other recent proposals,"
as a general clause to govern all classes of tortious actions, that: "Any-
one who, through unlawful conduct, whether an intentional or negli-
gent commission or omission, damages another, is bound to
compensate him or her."98
The first proposal of 1887 for the BGB employed a more differen-
95. On the issue of the efficiency and wealth maximization orientation of the price the-
ory variation of American Economy Analysis of Law (especially Posner), see Discussion
papers in Symposium, Change in the Common Law. Legal and Economic Perspectives, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 189, 189-427 (1980); Symposium on Eff ciency as a Legal Concern. 8 HOISTR.A
L. REV. 485, 485-770 (1980).
96. I, 6, § 11 of the Prussian General Land Law of 1796; Art. 1382 of the French Civil
Code of 1804; § 1295 of the Austrian ABGB of 1811; Arts. 501 and 41 of the Swiss Obliga-
tion Law of 1881/1911; and Art. 2043 of the Italian Civil Code of 1942.
97. On the legal history of the tort law codification, see I B. SCIIMIEDEL, DEuKTSOaU-
GATIONEN NACH DEUTSCHEM KARTELLRECHT. ZV1LRECHTSDOGMATiSCHiE GRUN-
DLEGUNG: UNTERSUCHUNGEN zu 823 ABS. 2, BGB (1974); Fraenkel, Tatbestand und
Zurechnung bei 823 Abs. I BGB (1978).
98. BGB § 1, 11, TE. cited in Fraenkel, supra note 97, at 98.
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tiated formulation: "Anyone who causes damage to another through
intentional or negligent unlawful conduct-be it by commission or
omission-if he or she had foreseen the damage, or if the damage was
foreseeable, is bound to compensate for such damage, even if the extent
of the damage was not foreseeable."99
Section 704, paragraph 2, regulated as a subdivision of paragraph
1 the violation of subjective rights and comparable legal interests. Be-
cause paragraph 1 had codified the Jhering thesis that liability should
be limited to such damage which would have been foreseeable, this
special inclusion was necessary, as the proposal's intent was to exclude
the factor of the foreseeability of the damage in cases of violations of
subjective rights and enumerated legal interests.
The second commission (by a ten to eight vote) found the general
liability principle contained in section 704, paragraph 1, too far-reach-
ing. Two limitations were incorporated. First, interests protected by
tort law were equated with enumerated legal interests and with the ab-
solute right.'° Second, the commission limited the relevance of the vio-
lation of a statute for tort law to cases where a "statute designed to
protect another" had been violated."10
This then was the basis for the division of an originally almost
unified concept of tort as unlawful action in violation of legally pro-
tected interests into two basic types of independent tort clauses: viola-
tion of legally protected interests (Rechtsgutsverlelzung) and
contravention of a "statute designed to protect another" (Schutz-
gesetzverstof3). Section 704 became section 746, paragraph 1, in the
second draft of 1895 and contained the following wording: "Anyone
who, whether intentionally or negligently, unlawfully injures a right of
another, or who violates a statute designed to protect another, must
compensate the injured party for any damage thus incurred."'0 2 The
BGB also made this typological difference clear in section 823,
paragraphs 1 and 2; paragraph 1 explicitly made the enumerated legal
interests comparable to the subjective rights.
A third rule of tort liability was introduced as the general clause in
section 826.103 Under this clause, a person was liable if he or she inten-
tionally caused harm to another in a manner which was contra bonos
99. 2 DIE GESAMTEN MATERIALIEN ZUM BGB CXXII/CXXIII, § 704, 11 (Mugdan cd,
1899).
100. See Prot. II, supra note 25, at 571-72.
101. Id. at 567-68.
102. 2 DIE GESAMTEN MATERIALIEN ZUM BGB, supra note 99, at CXXIII.
103. BGB § 826 (contra bonos mores) had been § 705 (disloyal actions) in the first draft.
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mores. 104
Of the three main tort liability rules, section 823, paragraph 1, be-
came the most important. Section 823, paragraph 2, and section 826
had merely transformed preexistent statutes for the protection of an-
other and standards presumably present in the bourgeois ethic, into tort
liability law. Section 823, paragraph 1, however, attempted to realize
the Kantian principle of civil law, as built upon a basis of Lockean
possessive individualism: "The restriction of the freedom of each indi-
vidual, if it furthers the freedom of everyone, as specified in a general
statute." 105
The stance of section 823, paragraph 1, in its mere protection of
physical integrity and its guarantee of noncontravention of real prop-
erty and of intellectual properties in economic tort law, proved to be
too limited to demarcate the spheres of individuals' activities and inter-
ests in a society which was growing increasingly complex.
The loopholes which the narrow system of individual tort clauses
had left open in the BGB, especially the neglect of the protection of
third parties, assets, and honor by tort law, were filled by the judiciary
in diverse ways, including the development of contract-like and other
duties of care and protection by property owners and agents, the modi-
fication of the concept of culpability and the introduction of other sub-
jective rights within the meaning of section 823, paragraph 1. These
innovations occasionally crossed the boundary which constituted the
basic division between both contractual and tort liability and between
(tort) fault and strict liability. Judicially developed law often entailed
such innovations, which constituted social regulation by the judiciary,
and which were rendered necessary by an inadequate legislative basis,
in this case, the lack of a general clause for both fault and strict liabil-
ity. The important point here was to correct the basic market and con-
tract-oriented liberal structure, and the dominance of the property rule
and the corresponding limited number of tort fault liability clauses.
The intent was to expand the dominance of the liability rule at the cost
of the property rule through more flexible mechanisms of situative risk
distribution.
The judiciary, with a grain of salt, thus returned to the general tort
concept of the first draft of the BGB in 1887. "In this area we find...
that German law also contains a general clause, according to which
104. See MOTIVE, supra note 31, at 727.
105. I. KANT, METAPHYSIK DER SrrrFN, PART I: RECHTSLEIRE, A 33/B 33, 34 (1797-
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everyone should exercise reasonable care, in order to avoid damage to
others."' 0 6 This fact was recognized as early as 1940 by the Committee
for Reform of the Law of Damages of the German Academy of Law,
which proposed the following general basic principle of tort liability in
section 1, paragraph 1: "The intentional or negligent unlawful damage
to another obliges one to compensate for the damage thus caused."'
' 0 7
C. From the Absolute Subjective Right to a Socially Protected
Relationship
The tort clauses of the BGB were undisputedly governed until re-
cently by section 823, paragraph 1. Section 823, in turn, was governed
by the absolute subjective right, which took real property as its proto-
type. Corresponding to this were the specially designed exclusivity
rights of intellectual property. These were: copyright laws, design,
technical protection rights (patents and registered design), and, with
limitations, trademark rights (trademark, equipment, etc.).
The social position of the citizen in the atomistic possessive market
society was circumscribed by the absolute subjective right. Here, a
product of physical or intellectual work was attributed exclusively to
the "manufacturer," and was thereby made into an object of market
transactions. With the absolute subjective right, the legal sphere of the
individual was quasi-physically, spatially and objectively delimited, as
was the physical interests such as life, body, health and freedom. The
concentration of protection by tort law upon absolute subjective rights
and its explicit exclusion of relative rights (le., obligations), is a reflec-
tion of the strict dichotomy between contracts and torts, which is char-
acteristic of the liberal BGB law of obligations. From this protected
position, the possessive individual could set business goals in autono-
mous arrangements, distribute risks among the parties of a contract,
make profits, and suffer losses. Absolute right functioned as the fixed
point in a stratified order of non-contractual civil law liability:
(1) compensation for concrete damage upon culpable injury of an indi-
vidual's right of exclusivity;' 0 8 (2) transfer of objective value accrued in
cases of unlawful but still nonculpable contravention of absolute
rights;0 9 and (3) liability for profits in cases of intentional operation of
106. 2 E. VON CAEMMERER, FESTSCHRIFT DEUTSCHER JURISTENTAo 49, 80 (1960).
107. GRUNDFRAGEN DER REFORM, supra note 59, at 90.
108. BGB § 823, I, and the law of intellectual property.
109. BGB §§ 812, 1, 2nd alternative, 818: Eingrosfkondtion.
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a business which exclusively belongs to another." 10
When the ideal of the social model of the liberal market and
contract society yields to a more complex social reality, characterized
by a market which is diminishingly competitive and less open to all
producers by international concentration of production and trade and
by wide-reaching state regulation of the economy, the social position of
the individual can no longer be appropriately described by absolute
subjective rights. As a fixed point of tort and condictio liability for
interference, it has thus entered a crisis period.'
The preliminary tendency of the BGB law of obligation has thus
far been the development of economic tort law, especially the law of
unfair competition 1 2 and the law of intellectual property. With the
recognition by judge-made law of the so-called treble damage calcula-
tion in "immaterial goods law,""' 3 the boundary between damage tort
and conditional intervention liability has long since become fluid. The
judiciary has, however, extended the application of the treble damage
calculation and the legal remedy of condictio based on interference
(Eingrffskondition) from cases of violation of absolute rights to other
legally protected positions."
4
One symptomatic expression of this tendency is the recognition of
"other rights" in the sense of section 823, paragraph 1. Without a
doubt, these do not enjoy the status of property nor do they include the
right to an exclusive enjoyment of the yields of a physical or non-physi-
cal object. Rather, they constitute, with a number of rules of conduct, a
socially protected relationship: The filling of a loophole in legal pro-
tection by the judiciary, by applying the general clauses of the right to
one's personality (allgemeines Personlichkeitsrecht)IIs and the so-called
110. See, eg., Von Caemmerer, Bereicherung und unerlaubte Bandlung, in I FE's-
SCHRIFT RABEL 333 (1954).
111. Compare the evaluations from different points in time, L. Raiser, 1961 JZ 464; N.
LUHMANN, I JAHRBUCH FUR REcHTSSOZIOLOGIE UND RECHTSTHEORIE 321 (1970); and U.
K. PREUSS, Dm INTERNALISIERUNG DES SUBJEKTS 15-62 (1979).
112. Let, Gesetz gegen unlauteren Wetibewerb of 1896/1909.
113. Since 35 RGZ 63 (1895), Ariston. For more details, see JoEROES, Jupra note 15.
114. 20 BGHZ 345 (1956) (the right to one's personality), Paul Dahlke, 34 BGHZ 320
(1961) (trademark law), Vitasulfal, 44 BGHZ 372 (1966), Messmer-Tee, 60 BGHZ 206
(1973) (Law of names and firms), Miss Petit, 60 BGHZ 168 (1973) (up to unfair competition
law standards), Modeneuheit, Bundesgerichshof, 1977 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR GEWERBLICHEN
RECH=SSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 539, Prozep3Brechner. On this development,
see KONIG, FESTSCHRIFT FOR VON CAEMMERER 179 (1978); Brandner, 1980 GRUR 359;
Krasser, 1980 GRUR INTERNATIONAL 259.
115. Since 13 BGHZ 334 (1954), see P. SCHWERDTNER. DAS PERS65NLICHKEITSREC1rT IN
DER DEUTSCHEN ZIVILRECHTSORDNUNG (1977).
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right to an established and operative business (Recht am eingerichteten
und ausgei'bten Gewerbebetrieb).116 Another manifestation of this ten-
dency is the development of tort protection of "relative rights", espe-
cially the obligatory rights of a lease-holder."17  Against the
background of a transformed notion of unlawfulness, this view increas-
ingly holds that within privity of contract, one must differentiate be-
tween rules of conduct that exclusively bind the parties concerned to a
special obligation, and rules that forbid a third party to prevent fulfill-
ment of contractual duties or to hinder the exercise of relative rights.
The establishment of liability begins with the justifiable need for pro-
tection of a social relationship and not with a formal qualification, such
as the opposition between exclusive rights and relative rights." 18
D. From a Negative to a Positive Concept of Unlawfulness in
Section 823, Paragraph 1
From the very beginning, unlawfulness was a weak point in the
BGB's concept of tort. To be sure, the historic drafters of the BGB
explicitly defined tort as unlawful conduct." 9 Just as no appropriate
concept of tort was ever developed, neither was a unified concept of
unlawfulness. Proposals and drafts always had two main forms of un-
lawful conduct in mind: violation of protective statutes and violation
of subjective rights. This particularization of the concept of unlawful-
ness was strengthened in further legislative proceedings. The BGB
thus has developed a concept of unlawfulness for each of the three
leading individual clauses: unlawfulness related to injury of legal in-
terests (Rechtsgutsverletzung, section 823, paragraph 1); violation of a
statute designed to protect another (Schutzgesetzversto P, section 823,
paragraph 2); and conduct contra bonos mores (Sittenwidrigkeit, section
826). The notion of breach of contract (Vertragswidrigkeit) was pro-
posed as a fourth concept of unlawfulness in the law of damages.
Numerous influences prevented the development of a positive con-
cept of unlawfulness 2 in the framework of section 823, paragraph 1,
the original major clause of tort liability. These influences were: the
116. Since 58 RGZ 24 (1904), see H. BUCHNER, DIE BEDEUTUNG DES RECIITS AM
EINGERICHTETEN UND AUSGEOBTEN GEWERBEBETRIEB FOR DEN DELIKTISCHEN UN-
TERNEHMENSSCHUTZ (1971).
117. Since 59 RGZ 326 (1904), see Medicus, Besitzschultz Durch 4nsphlchs4ufSc/laden.
sersatz 165 AcP 115 (1965), and J. R6DIG, DIE ERFOLLUNG DES TATBESTANDES DES § 823
ABS. I BGB DURCH SCHUTZGESETZVERSTOP3 (1973).
118. E.g., absolute vs. simple license.
119. MOTIVE, supra note 31, at 725.
120. For the positive concept of unlawfulness, see infra p. 383-87.
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Gemeines Recht tradition of "subjective unlawfulness" (culpable un-
lawful behavior), strengthened by the dominance of the later nine-
teenth century cu pa doctrine and the axiom of unity of the fault
concept in civil and penal law; the attempts based on penal law at thor-
ough structuring of the tort clauses (Tatbestand, Rechtswidrigkeit,
Schuld); the societal and public policy attempts to limit tort liability to
the guarantee of habeas corpus and property; and attempts to limit ju-
dicial discretion through clearly formulated liability clauses. An exter-
nal intrusion into the objective area of property and legal interests was
eo ipso unlawful. The only remaining responsibility in the judgment of
unlawfulness was to ascertain whether the initially indicated unlawful-
ness was, as an exception, excluded by an alleged and proven counter-
indication (so-called Unrechtsausschliessungsgrund). This negative
concept of unlawfulness has long dominated the tort doctrines of sec-
tion 823, paragraph 1, as a concept of violation of enumerated rights
and legal interests (Erfolgsunrecht).1
2 1
The numerous corrections of the original method of loss distribu-
tion through BGB legislation implied a reduction in the relevance of
the objective part of section 823, paragraph 1, and its central function
in the establishment and limitation of liability. Among these correc-
tions were: a tendency towards a general clause concerning (fault) tort
liability as well as strict liability; objectification of liability for negli-
gence; development of contract-like duties of care and protection, and
of other forms of matching contractual and tort liability; recognition of
"other rights" without the quality of an absolute right; and the gradual
decline of the absolute rights as typical of those interests protected by
tort law. The function fulfilled by the objective part of the liability
clause was transferred to the level of unlawfulness. It thus became
necessary to positively evaluate the concrete damage-causing behavior
as being contrary to law so that an obligation to make reparations for
such damage could be established and limited. The division, adopted
from penal law, of objective unlawfulness into Taibestandsmtssigkeit
and Rechtswidrigkeit (unlawfulness), in the framework of section 823,
paragraph 1, was in this way revoked. 22
At first, partially under the influence of penal law, the modem rep-
resentatives of subjective negligence theory determined objective duties
of care ("external care," du3ere Sorgfalt) to be an element of unlawful-
ness. This took place around the end of the 1950's or beginning of the
121. For the evolution from a negative to a positive concept of unlawfulness, see F.
DEUTSCH, supra note 18, § 14: unlawfulness; and H. K6Tz, DELIKTSRECHT 55 (2d cd. 1979).
122. See infra notes 123-27.
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1960's. Objective duties of care were transferred out of the fault con-
cept of negligence, which was limited to subjective predictability and
avoidability. 23
It was also stressed in connection with section 823, paragraph 1,
that the main task was to work out the rules of behavior and their pro-
tective area, the violation of which would in tort law constitute relevant
objective misconduct. In view of its legislative formulation, the special
problem of section 823, paragraph 1, as opposed to section 823, para-
graph 2, and sections 824 and 826, was to make the unlawfulness of the
outcome of specific legal interest violations compatible with the unlaw-
fulness of the behavior which produced such violations. This problem
did not lead to a doubling of unlawfulness in section 823, paragraph 1,
but rather, as had been the case with the legal duties to provide general
safety (Verkehrssicherungspflichten) for the last eighty years, 124 to an
emancipation of unlawfulness, as an objective violation of duties of
reasonable care, from the precondition of a violation of some legal
interest.
Currently, this is increasingly being discovered, under the designa-
tion of the doctrine of unlawful conduct ( Verhaltensunrechi), as the ba-
sic structural problem of all tort clauses. 125 The "tort principle" is seen
as the "command of selective determination of subjectively enforceable
commands and prohibitions."' 6 Unlawfulness is the prerequisite for
damage reparations, for actions based on interference, and for injunc-
tions for protection of legal interests. It contains the positive ascertain-
ment of an objective breach of duty in concrete behavior. Section 823,
paragraph 1, is to that extent also to be understood, in its classical core,
primarily as a clause governing conduct which constitutes a breach of
duty (Terhaltensunrechtstatbestand), modified solely through the neces-
sary further inclusion of concrete violations of enumerated legal inter-
ests.. Breach of duty makes one liable only when it occurs in
connection with the violation of such an interest. On the other hand,
the violation of legally protected interests, enumerated in section 823,
paragraph 1, remains irrelevant for tort law, if the injuring conduct is
appropriate iih the particular situation. Thus, for example, a person
123. Nipperdey, Rechtswidrigkeft, Sozialaddquanz, Fahrldsslgkeit, Schuld im Zivi/recht,
1957 NJW 1777; 2 E. VON CAEMMERER, FESTSCHRIFT DEUTSCHER JURISTENTAG (1960).
124. Since 52 RGZ 373 (1902); 53 RGZ 53 (1902).
125. W. MONZBERG, VERHALTEN UND ERFOLG ALS GRUNDLAGEN DER RECHT-
SWIDRIGKEIT UND HAFTUNG (1966); J. R6DIG, supra note 117; B. SCHMIEDEL, supra note
97; K. SCHMIDT, KARTELLVERFAHRENSRECHT, KARTELLVERWALTUNOSRECtIT,
BflRGERLICHES RECHT (1977).
126. W. MONZBERG, supra note 125, at 354.
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who behaves in an orderly manner in street traffic is behaving lawfully
per se, and in the event that his or her behavior injures a legally pro-
tected interest, he or she does not need a corresponding ground ofjusti-
fication of socially adequate behavior. 27 The burden of proof for
breach of objective duties of care, if allotted according to the accepted
rules of evidence, is borne by the injured plaintiff.
In contrast to this, the prevailing opinion is based on the view that
not every causally adequate interference with an absolute right or legal
interest is eo ipso unlawful. Only in cases of direct injury does the re-
sulting violation of a legal interest indicate unlawfulness. With indirect
violations (commissions or omissions), standards of behavior and du-
ties of conduct are necessary for the ascertainment of unlawfulness. 28
In view of the diminishing "socially typical overtness" and representa-
tiveness of absolute rights, and in view of the dual difficulties in distin-
guishing direct from indirect violations of legally protected interests,
whether caused by commission or omission, the judgment of unlawful-
ness, must fundamentally begin with an ascertainment of whether the
injuring conduct matches the legislatively or judicially developed stan-
dards of conduct, and not with the outcome of such conduct. In this
respect, the following statement can also be added to the first attempt at
a "Restatement" of the BGB tort law by the Academy for German Law
in 1940: "An omission or commission is unlawful when it violates a
legally established duty, which is designed to protect the person or the
assets of the injured party."'2 9
Modem tort law as "law of protective duties" thus concerns itself,
on the one hand, with the exoneration and removal from liability of
interests worthy of social protection. This is accomplished by deroga-
tion of the property rule through transfer of the damage risk onto the
tortfeasor in classical cases of conflict, 30 and in newly arising social
conflicts, with the initial allocation of risks involved in social conduct.
This allocation of damages fundamentally takes place in two steps: in
the evaluation of a social relationship as worthy of protection in certain
respects and for certain reasons (e.g., efficiency, distribution, justice), or
in the formulation of corresponding rules of conduct, which are some-
127. See 21 BGHZ 24 (1964) and R. WIETHULTER, DER RECHITFERTIGUNOSGRUND DES
VERKEHRSRICHTIGEN VERHALTENS (1960).
128. E. DEUTSCH, supra note 18, at 195; StoU, Unrechtsopen bei Verlet.ung absoluter
Rechte, 162 AcP 203 (1963); Larenz, Rechtswidrigkeft und Handlungsbegr!in Zilreeht. I
FESTSCHRIFT DULLE 169 (1963).
129. GRUNDFRAGEN DER REFORM, supra note 59, at 49.
130. BGB § 831.
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times given by the legislature, but primarily laid down in judicially de-
veloped law, or through reinterpretation of statutes as being designed
to protect another, in the sense of section 823, paragraph 2.131
If the legal interests and rights enumerated in the core of section
823, paragraph 1, seem to be merely special provisions on legally pro-
tected interests, then it follows that the overextension of the division
between absolute and relative rights loses its relevance. Relative rights
(assets), in the traditional sense, can also become objects of tort protec-
tion. The so-called right to an established and operative business was
from the start no more than a matter of special protection of economic
interests for entrepreneurs. The limited general clauses of "a person's
rights to his/her personality," of the "right to a business," and of legal
duties to provide general safety, which have been somewhat justifiably
designated as "unwritten section 823, paragraph 3," 132 are by their logi-
cal structure cases of application of the notion, expressed in section 823,
paragraph 2, and section 826, of protection of specific social interests
through the formulation of appropriate rules of conduct. They are not
cases of application of section 823, paragraph 1, and its concept of the
protection of enumerated legal interests.
In addition to the theory of unlawful conduct, this also relates to
the second modem trend in tort law-the departmentalization of the
"classical" tort law through the addition of special tort law as described
above and as most prominently represented by the contract-like duties
of care and protection in particular professional duties to protect assets
of other parties.
This principle of liability protection of certain social interests
through duties of conduct, and the concept of tort as a violation of
these duties through unreasonable conduct, make it possible today to
combine the classical general tort law and the modern special tort law
by means of a theory of unlawful conduct: tort law protects legitimate
status quo interests against social misconduct.
Unlawfulness as a breach of duty does not thereby emanate from
care per se or from generally correct conduct. The duty of careful con-
duct is always related to pre-existing identifiable interest. The specifi-
cation of which interests are legally protected, from what sort of injury
and by whom, is the task of determining the personal and objective
area of protection of the respective rule of conduct.
131. F.e. § 1 of the Antitrust Law (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen), 64 BGHZ
323 (1975).
132. Mertens, Delikisrecht und Sonderprivatrecht - Zur Rechts/orbi/dung des delikilschelt
Schutzes Yon Vermagensinteressen, 178 AcP 227, 251 (1978).
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The American concept of negligence liability, which does not dis-
tinguish between unlawfulness and culpability in the manner in which
German Civil Law customarily has, evolved this distinction in Car-
dozo's famous Ultramares decision of the New York Court of Appeals
in 1931: "There exists no liability for negligence in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class."' 
33
E. Correction of the Culpa Doctrine Through Objectification of
Civil Negligence Liability'34
As has been emphasized several times, the culpa doctrine became
the determining force of the BGB law of damages. The responsibility
ethic of German idealism and the reception of the postclassical, subjec-
tively determined cu/pa concept of the Roman Law led, in late nine-
teenth century Germany, to the establishment of a unified fault concept
in civil and penal law.'35 Fault was a morally reprehensible abuse of
freedom of will. The constitutive elements of fault were: accountability
and responsibility of the delinquent and imputability (Zurechenbarkeit)
of the results of his actions. The accountability or tort capacity as-
sumed the ability to apply reason and "free determination of will,"
both of which were expected of an adult, although this assumption
could be rebutted.136  The imputability of the result involved:
(1) grasping the consequences of a certain commission or omission (in-
tention); and (2) the foreseeability and avoidability of an outcome
through application of the care of a reasonably prudent man (im
Verkehr erforderliche Sorgfalt, section 276, paragraph 1; negligence).
In other words: "[I]ntention is the knowledge of, and negligence the
possibility to know, the outcome."' 37 Out of this unified double concept
of fault, for civil and penal law and for intention and negligence, arose
the emancipation of civil negligence through objectification of the stan-
dard of liability. An appraisal in matters of civil negligence must
therefore primarily clarify the logical relationship of its central ele-
ments: subjective/individual and objective/general standards of con-
duct, duty of care, and foreseeability. The unified fault concept of
negligence, in the framework of a tort law characterized by its protec-
133. Ultramares v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
134. For an early comparative study of German and American negligence law see F.
KESSLER, DIE FAHRLASSIGKEIT IM NORDAMERIKANISCHEN DEUKTSRECUT (1932).
135. VON LISZT, DIE DELIKTSOBLIGATIONEN IM SYSTEM DES BURGERLICIIEN
GESETZBUCHES (1898).
136. BGB § 828, 1 2 (an adult of 18 years).
137. VON LiszT, supra note 135, at 54.
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tion of enumerated legal interests, included from its inception both the
duty of care to prevent violation of such rights (external care) and the
foreseeability and avoidability of the injuries in question (Innere
Sorgfalt; internal care).
In opposition to purely subjective or objective theories, the pre-
dominant opinion in civil jurisprudence was always represented by a
"middle path between generalized and individual observation."' 13
Here objective requirements were applied in the area of breach of duty
of care, and subjective requirements in the question of foreseeability.
Thus, the "objectification" of negligence liability was always discussed
in a double perspective. First, and primarily, the shift of the breach of
duty of care from the area of fault to classification as an element of
unlawfulness is dealt with. On the basis of the tort concept of unlaw-
fulness, conduct which is a breach of a duty of care owed by the injur-
ing party to the injured party constitutes an unlawful action, as defined
in section 823 and the following sections. Civil jurisprudence and civil
law practice have, as emphasized, measured this breach of duty primar-
ily on an objective scale of care from the start. Whoever lives up to the
objective behavioral demands made on him or her in his or her profes-
sion or role has also acted legally if he or she causes damage to others;
whoever does not live up to these demands thereby creates a risk for
others which he or she, and not his or her environment, must assume.
Who is affected by such duties, and how extensive these duties are to
be, are questions to be determined by the judgment of unlawfulness
and are in the area of protection for specific persons and objectives.
Second, the fault aspect of negligence, that is, the question of fore-
seeability and avoidability of the breach of duty, presents itself only to
the person who has violated these duties of ordinary conduct. The cur-
rent predominant opinion also applies here an objective-average stan-
dard of knowledge and conduct: negligence is objective foreseeability
of duties of conduct. 139
This outdated academic view is today challenged even more
strongly by the fundamental question of the extent to which the dual
concept of negligence (internal and external care) can be retained.
From the beginning, this concept was determined more by the strongly
subjective nineteenth century dogma of the unified fault concept than
138. Id.; M. ROMELIN, DIE GRONDE DER SCHADENSZURECHNUNG UND DIE STLLUNO
DES DEUTSCHEN BGB ZUR OBJEKTIVEN SCHADENSERSATZPFLICHT (1896); Wahl, in GRUND-
FRAGEN DER REFORM, supra note 59.
139. Bundesgerichshof, 1979 NJW 2097; K. LARENZ, SCHULDRECHT § 20111 (13th cd.
1982); E. DEtTSCH, supra note 18, § 18.
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by the literal wording of section 276, paragraph 1, sentence 2. If one
correctly objectifies the foreseeability, it in fact loses its function. As a
rule, where an objective duty of care is breached, one must also find
that this duty was objectively recognizable. This remains a relevant
factual situation, as pointed out by Mertens,140 only where the require-
ment that a duty of conduct be objectively recognizable plays an in-
dependent role (ie., where a legal decision in a high court initially
formulates new duties of conduct or care). Here, according to Mertens,
the fault element of objective recognizability makes it possible for the
court to promulgate new duties of conduct while not requiring the
party who breached the duty to pay compensation in the case at
hand. 4 ' Even in this situation, however, objective foreseeability is
without function, because the applicability of a duty of conduct did not
previously exist. In other words, the concept of negligence should be
released from the outdated unified concept of fault and reduced to the
objective breach of a duty of conduct. Civil negligence is neither more
nor less than the breach of a standard of conduct which was to be ex-
pected from the particular person in his social conduct. In the words of
Mertens, "Negligence is liability for the performance of a social
role." 1
4 2
This fundamental decision in favor of a unified concept of civil
negligence based on objective breach of duty is justifiable in part be-
cause it is a widespread practice, 143 the results of which must be partly
rationalized through the acceptance of so-called takeover fault
(Ubernahmeverschulden). The functional difference between civil and
penal law is critical. Tort law concerns itself with allocation of socially
typical risks, and not with the penalizing of individual instances of un-
acceptable social behavior. The cu/pa doctrine, in the form given by
legislators and jurists in the latter nineteenth century, was an exceed-
ingly historic solution to this allocation problem. As demonstrated, this
answer of the BGB legislature had to be corrected in many ways
through the judiciary and the legislature. The reduction of negligence
to the objective breach of duty (external care) is a further correction.
The objection that the matter has to do with a "legal-political evalua-
tion which is inimical to the fault concept"I is a fossilization of the
140. Hi. Mertens, in III MUNICH COMMENTARY ON THE BGB § 823 n. 44 (1980).
141. Id.
142. Id. § 823 n. 43.
143. See, ag., Bundesgerichshof, 1961 NJW 600; Bundesgerichshof, 1968 JZ 103;
Bundesgerichshof, 1970 VERSR 182.
144. U. Huber, Zivilrechtliche Fahrldsfgkeit, in FESTSCHRIPF E.R. HunER 274 (1973).
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allocation decision of 1896145 into a permanent decision immune from
social change. The opposing objection, that a corresponding correction
in this central area is a duty reserved to the legislature, has some justifi-
cation, but it misconstrues the normative force of a de facto transfer of
power from legislature to judiciary with regard to the further develop-
ment of civil law in this century.
14 6
This unified, objectified civil negligence liability is, nevertheless,
fault liability. It exclusively allocates the social risks for damage that
were avoidable under the requirements of objective care and foresee-
ability. These requirements distinguish fault liability from strict liabil-
ity, which, within certain limits determined by public policy
evaluations, calls for reparations for fundamentally unavoidable dam-
age. Objective negligence liability has a certain element of nonfault in
the traditional subjective sense, insofar as it contains an unconditional
guarantee for the existence of socially expected capabilities. "Excusa-
ble" individual deficiencies do not free one from liability.
F. Limitation or Expansion of Judicial Discretion
The historic BGB legislature has also been contradicted in yet an-
other area by actual developments. The system of individual clauses of
tort liability should narrow judicial discretion. Constitutional require-
ments for security of law, and the postulate of liberal social theory for
the broadest calculability of both judicial and executive action, merged
here with the ideas of French left-Rhine civil procedures of the role of
the judge, which had already decidedly determined the Zi/iprozess-
ordnung (ZPO) conception of 1877.147
But it is not in accord with the tendency of the proposal nor with the
German people's conception of the judicial office, to burden the
courts with the solution of such tasks, which should be solved
through statute. One can also overlook neither the consequences of
145. The original BGB represents the choice of an historically determined unified con-
cept and the resulting relationship of the property rule and liability rule in civil damages
law.
146. Compare the different national analyses: U. DIEDERICHSEN, DIE FLUCIIT DES
GESETZGEBERS AUS DER POLITISCHEN VERANTWORTUNG IM ZIVILRECHT (1974) (West Gcr-
many); G. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA, AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY (1980) (United
States); J. GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF THE JUDICIARY (2nd ed. 1981) (United Kingdom);
Lilcke, The Common Law asArbitral Law. A Defense of Judicial Law Making, 1982 RECI IT-
STHEORIE 5, 161 (Australia).
147. In contrast to the present ZPO, the ZPO of 1877 left more power to the parties to
control the course of the court's proceedings. In this regard, the 1877 ZPO was more similar
to American procedure than is the present ZPO. See R. WASSERMANN, DES SOZIALE ZIVIL-
PROZEI3 (1978).
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bestowing an authoritative position upon the judge, nor the possibil-
ity that the German judiciary could arrive at such aberrations as are
apparent in numerous French judicial verdicts. Keeping these mis-
givings in mind, however, it may be nonetheless advantageous to al-
ready provide the judge with a certain objective standard for his/her
judgment in the law. 48
In no area was the legislative concept of the BGB so early and so
substantially subverted. From its inception, the BGB failed in its "so-
cial mission." ' 49 The discrepancy between the atomistic possessive
market society's social model as reflected in BGB law and the social
reality in the German empire made it necessary, as early as the late
nineteenth century, for legislation to provide for socioeconomically rel-
evant areas through special statute. The dichotomy of BGB law and
special civil law (Sonderprivatrecht) was inherent in BGB law from the
start. Labor law and economic law developed as a "critique of BGB
civil law."' 0 The emergence of areas of social inequality and the rising
demands for social regulation through the judiciary made processes of
materialization indispensable in classical BGB civil law.153 This inno-
vative development of civil law was carried furthest by judicial law in
the areas of obligation, real property, corporation, competition, and in-
tellectual property law.' The main points in the area of tort law have
thus already been presented numerous times.
Essential to this reversal of the relationship of general judicial lim-
itation and necessary judicial discretion or activism is, however, the
fact that behind this concept of socioeconomic regulation through law,
especially marked through protective judicial policy in the area of non-
accidental liability law, there no longer exists in the developed Western
industrial societies a way back to the liberal nineteenth century consti-
tutional state, with its division of power between judges applying the
law and legislators making the laws. This can be demonstrated with
two theses that can be sufficiently substantiated by the last hundred
years of German legal history: (1) legislative acts in the area of private
economic law exhaust themselves to a large extent in the reformulation
of positions that the judiciary has already treated; 153 and (2) statutes
148. Prot. II, supra note 25, at 571.
149. Even today, the basic and current critique is 0. voN GIERKE, DIE SOZJALE AuF-
GABE DES PRIVATRECHTS (1889).
150. See H.D. ASSMANN, G. BRUIGGEMEIER, D. HART & C. JOERGES, .spra note 13.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 16, 27, 42, 45, 54.
153. See, eg., The Ministerial Draft for Amending Liability Law (1967); the Act on
Standard Contract Clauses of 1976; an Act concerning tours sold by travel agencies,
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within the area of economic law, as a rule, are already outmoded when,
after long and expensive legislative processes, they finally come into
force. The requirements for socially adequate solutions are so complex
today, and a unified social model of late capitalist, post-industrial soci-
ety, which would guarantee correct and consistent political behavior, is
so far from sight that, seemingly, solutions are only to be formulated in
an extremely reflexive learning and communication process between
judiciary, ministerial bureaucracy, science, concerned lobbies, and reg-
ulatory commissions. Rudolf Wietholter speaks in this context of
"proceduralization,"' I 4 Joerges introduces the formula of "Practice as a
discovery process."' 5 5 Teubner formulates as a new post-modem para-
digm the "reflexive law.'1
5 6
III. TORTS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF POST-
MODERN LAW: THE LAW OF CONTORTS
(SONDERDELITSRECHT) AS SOCIAL
REGULATION BY THE JUDICIARY
The foregoing analysis of liability law has attempted to demon-
strate that in modem West Germany tort law has increasingly become
a means of social regulation through judge-made rules of conduct. As
we have seen, BGB tort law was conceived as a clearly delineated ex-
ception to the liberal property rule: to provide the necessary protection
for life and property. The dilemma was that it had failed from the start
in its "social mission." The BGB of 1896 has always been a civil law
without a civil society. This concept assumed both the separation of
the state from the economy and the practicability of self-regulation of
the economy through the market. By contrast, in a highly organized
social system, with complex interdependent relationships between state
and economy, the function of modem tort law is to compensate for
partial failures of the market economy and to balance out diverse social
Reisevertragsgesetz of 1979; the small amendment to the Law of Companies with Limited
Liability of 1980.
154. Wieth~lter, supra note 13, at 38; Wietholter, Sozialwissenshafiiiche Modelle im Win.
schafisrecht, und Materialisierungen und Prozeduralsierung Yon Recht, in EUROPEAN UNi-
VERSITY INSTITUTE (EUI), ECONOMICS, SOCIOLOGY AND LAW: SOCIAL SCIENCE
CONTRIBUTIONS TO LEGAL ANALYSIS (unpublished papers forthcoming in Florence, Italy,
in 1983).
155. C. JOERGES, VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ ALS RECHTSPROBLEM (1981).
156. Catchword: "process from contract to regulation to reflexivity." For more details
see Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 401
(1983) and The Papers and Proceedings of the Conference on Reflexive Law and the Regu-
latory Crisis (Madison, Wis., July 18-21, 1983).
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inequities through flexible and appropriate redefinition and division of
the social risks. This task must be shared with state-developed systems
of social insurance. As the state and the economy move from indepen-
dence to interdependence, the relationship between contract and tort
developed by nineteenth century legal science has become untenable.
To be sure, classical contract and tort law are not (to use Gilmore's
phrase) 'dead,' 157 but their relevance to modem society has been
greatly changed and their doctrinal separation is less clear.
Both private, autonomous assumption of obligations through con-
tract and imposition of obligations through general tort rules are today
overshadowed by the dominant phenomenon of social regulation. In-
dications of this in contract law are:
(1) the classical notion of contract (offer and acceptance) is sup-
plemented by noncontractual forms of self-obligation through unilat-
eral transaction-related conduct 5 ' and by forms of social self-
obligation through economic monopolies and comparable positions of
dominance;
159
(2) the content of each contract which is not individually negoti-
ated is fundamentally subject to determination by the judiciary, as set
forth in section 9 and following sections of the Act on the Law of Stan-
dard Contract Terms; 6' and
(3) the cornerstone of contract, BGB section 305-freedom of
contract-has been reduced in most daily transactions to the freedom
to take it or leave it. Subject to these substantial limitations, the con-
tract retains its irreplacable function as a means for individual social
planning through binding designation of goals. Attributable disap-
pointment of contract performance leads to compensation for damages
resulting from failure to perform (contract damages). However, that
which in German law, in contrast to American law, has found its way
as contract-like liability into contract law, should be returned to its
proper place-in tort law. Modem German tort law is no longer the
tort law of the nineteenth century and the legislative concept of the
BGB. The classical "general" tort law has increasingly withdrawn be-
157. G. GILMORE, supra note 73, at 3. Compare I.R. MACNEIL, TiE NEw SOCIAL CoN-
TRACT (1980) (an inquiry into modem contractual relations).
158. E.g.: advertising, information given by a professional See generally, J. K6NDGEN,
supra note 86, at 284; M. LEHMANN, supra note 88. See Bruiggemeier, Vertrag--Quasi- Ver-
trag-Sonder-Delikt-Delikt, 1982 AKTIENGESELLSCHAFr 268.
159. Catchword. contracts of adhesion (Kontrahierungszrwng). See Bydlinski and Kil-
ian, 180 AcP 1, 47 (1980). See aso J. K6NDGEN, supra note 86.
160. Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der .Algemeinen Geschaifsbedingungen (AGBG) of
Dec. 9, 1976, 1976 BGB 1 3317. Act on Standard Contract Clauses of 1976.
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hind its modem variation-the special tort law (ite. judicially created
standards of conduct for the protection of certain safety interests in spe-
cific social areas). The development of this special tort law is at the
same time a manifest expression of increased social regulation in tort
law.
A redefinition of tort principles beginning with this idea must, in
West Germany, combine such seemingly disparate elements as con-
tract-like duties of professionals (vertragliche Verkehrspflichten der
Sachwalter), the duties of property owners and entrepreneurs to pro-
vide safety (Verkehrssicherungspflichlen der Sachhalter), the limited
general clauses guaranteeing the right to one's personality and the so-
called right to an established and operative business, the habeas corpus
guarantee of physical integrity, and the protective statutes within the
meaning of section 823, paragraph 2. This is possible if one sees the
fundamental impetus of this judicial social engineering through further
tort development as embodied in the social regulation of interests and
opportunities. This addresses the central point of the redefinition at-
tempted here for the concept of tort law. This redefinition is merely the
theoretical recognition of actual developments in modem tort law.
161
Until recently, one trend, equally characteristic of civil law and
common law systems, has stood in the limelight. This trend was the
transition from the nineteenth century orientation of tort law towards
protection of individual rights (e.g., habeas corpus and property inter-
ests; formal rationality, Erfolgsunrecht) to protection against culpable
behavior of the injuring party (duty of care; substantive rationality,
Verhaitensunrecht). On the other hand, in the second half of the twen-
tieth century a third level of new tort law development, the reorienta-
tion towards the position of the injured party, should be discussed.
This reorientation again only corresponds to the general develop-
ment of United States and Continental civil law in the late or post-
industrial societies, which has been described as a movement from con-
tract to status.' 62 In modem tort law, emphasis is no longer placed on
the individual interests of the injured party but, rather on socially pro-
tected positions, aspects of the former autonomous market citizen, such
as those of the employee, tenant, consumer, 163 investor, creditor, and
161. See Mertens, Deliktsrecht und Sonderpriairecht, 178 AcP 227 (1978).
162. Rudolf Wietholter, paraphrasing Henry S. Maine in ANCIENT LAW (1861), quoted
by Kotz, 29 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT 805, 806 (1965). See also Rehbinder, Status, Contract, and
the Welfare State, 23 STAN. L. REv. 941 (1971).
163. Act on the Law of Standard Contract Clauses of Dec. 9, 1976, 1976 BGB 1 3317.
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minority stock holder with corresponding subcategories. 164 Under this
new status-oriented development in tort law, the injured and injuring
sides are considered together, for the legislator or judiciary is to evalu-
ate a social status worthy of protection. Through the appropriate for-
mulation of statutory or judicial duties of conduct for the persons
subject to these duties, certain typical social positions become legally
protected interests. In other words, a relationship arises in which one
party has a duty to protect the other, independent of any individual
privity of contract.
Two consequences thus arise for tort law discussion. First, a
double dogmatic aspect and, second, a more general perspective. The
concept of special tort law, on the one hand, involves more generality
than is contained in the central liability rules of section 823, paragraph
1, section 823, paragraph 2, and section 826.65 This is also the opinion
of W. Friedmann and G. Gilmore. Friedmann proposes an as yet un-
developed unified tort clause of "social responsibility."' " Gilmore
postulates a "generalized theory of civil obligation,"'16 which in the
end combines contracts and torts into the broad category of "contorts."
On the other hand, these recent developments suggest a greater variety
of classifications of torts than the system of individual clauses and ac-
tions presently found in both the BGB and in common law. Certain
legal solutions should be developed on the basis of the specific interests
to be protected. Already in German tort law, in the framework of sec-
tion 823, paragraph 1, one speaks today less of property, physical integ-
rity and a right to an established and operative business, than of
medical malpractice, liability for sport injuries, products liability, lia-
bility for blackouts, liability for unjustified warning of violation of in-
dustrial property, and liability for public criticism of commercial
products by private persons or public organizations. Each area has its
respective genuine duty of care requirements, fault and no-fault re-
quirements, and allocation of the burden of proof.
On the other hand this generalized concept makes it unmistakably
clear that the three basic questions of liability law discussed above-
goals, damages, allocation of loss-arise anew in each of the newly ap-
164. The category "consumer," eg., would include the installment purchaser, the debtor
paying 20% interest, customers of used car dealers, and package tour purchasers. See gener.
ally C. JOERGES, supra note 155.
165. See C. JOERGES, supra note 155.
166. Friedmann, Nuisance Negligence and the Overlapping of Torts, 4 MOD. L. REv. 305
(1940).
167. G. GILMORE, supra note 73, at 94.
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pearing problem areas, and must be answered for each area upon the
basis of efficiency, equitable allocation and justice. Different answers
are appropriate for traffic and work accident law than in cases of pri-
vacy protection. Similarly, the answers in products liability law differ
from those in medical malpractice, in consumer law, law of unfair com-
petition and antitrust law, the law of intellectual property rights, and
again in various cases in corporation law. These answers are provided
in the most varied forms by different social institutions: by the legisla-
ture; through judge-made law; through state establishment of regula-
tory agencies; by cooperation between state and private sectors (e.g.,
forms of neo-corporatist intermediation); through forms of voluntary
control by business; and through self-regulation by organized private
interests. 16
8
This also touches on a question which can be only briefly dis-
cussed here: that of the place of special tort law in the context of post-
modem, post-formal law. We are accustomed to viewing modem legal
development as a process from status (traditional, repressive law) to
contract (formal, autonomous law) to social regulation (substantive, re-
sponsive law).' 69 Recently, in a critical discussion of the concept of
"responsive law" and on the conceptual basis of Luhmann's theory of
social systems, G. Teubner introduced the paradigm of "reflexive
law."'170 Reflexive law is post-regulatory' law, a reaction to the regu-
latory failure diagnosed by the economic theory of public decision,
172
just as regulation in its various forms was a reaction to the market fail-
ure diagnosed by welfare economics. 173 In contrast to contractual de-
regulation programs which are again tied to the market, reflexive law
aims at the institutionalization of collective, but at the same time non-
168. As a phenomenology of forms of merger of state and economy compare G. WINTER,
in RECHTSFORMEN DER VERFLECHTUNG VON STAAT UND WIRTSCIIAFT, 8 JAHRBUCH FOR
RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE UND RECHTSTHEORIE 9 (1982).
169. See generally H.S. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (1861); M. WEBER, RECHTSSOZIOLOOIE
(2nd ed. 1967); J. HABERMAS, STRUKTURWANDEL DER OFFENTLICHKEIT (1962); N.
LUHMANN, RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE (1972); R.M. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD
A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY (1976); P. NONET & P. SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN
TRANSITION: TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW (1978).
170. Teubner, supra note 156.
171. For an analysis of the American practice, see N. Reich, Marktuersagen und Poll-
ikversagen. Das Beispiel der American Federal Trade Commission (Discussion Paper 2/82,
Zentrumftir Europirsche Rechtspolitik, University of Bremen).
172. See generall, J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT. LoOi-
CAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1965).
173. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920).
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state and nonmarket forms of organizational and procedural self-
regulation.
Despite the value of the development of this element of reflexive
law, it would be equally overextended if it were to be used as a theoret-
ical unified formula for the analysis of the reality of post-modem law.
Only the formal law of civil society has in recent times presented a
concise legal concept based in both legal theory and social theory. 74
The social reality of post-modem law is characterized by the concomi-
tance of (1) residues of formality; (2) broad areas of materiality (social
regulation); (3) reformalization ("back to contract," deregulation); and
(4) reflexivity as a new, evolutionary creation (organization, collective
self-regulation, "voiCe"). Ir' A consistent, action guiding theory of the
post-modem society is still no more in sight than is the corresponding
legal theory.
176
Tort law is characterized by the same mixture of various rationali-
ties. The special tort law, described here for the West German situa-
tion, is a plea for acceptance, in the dogmatic discussion as well, of this
new concurrence of formal, substantive, and reflexive elements and for
an appropriate reformulation of the basic dogmatic terminology. Spe-
cial tort law is social regulation of the social behavior of the previously
autonomous market citizen. This task is carried out in probably all
developed, industrialized societies primarily through judge-made law.
It is dependent on support through academic jurisprudence and on oc-
casional correction through legislation.1 77 Objections to this discretion-
ary judicial protective policy cannot be remedied by removal to the
legislator, nor through the inauguration of academic jurisprudence as
an ersatz legislature.' 78 Rather it seems that assigning the required sys-
tematic social regulation to judicial activism belongs to a process for
which, in the German discussion, the terms "proceduralization" and
"practice as a discovery process" or even "reflexivity" have been devel-
oped, that is, a process in which the judiciary develops programs of
damage distribution and feeds these proposals into an institutionalized
learning process. In this process, academic jurisprudence and social
science, affected lobbying interests, interest groups, ministerial bureau-
174. M. WEBER, supra note 169.
175. In the sense of A.O. HiRsCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY (1970).
176. The most direct attempt in the German literature has been made by Jlrgen
Habermas. See J. HABERMAS, THEORIE DES KOMMUNIKATIVEN HANDELNS (1981).
177. For a critique of American tort law, see the article by Richard L. Abel, 8 BruT. J.
LAW AND Soc'Y 199 (1981), a shorter version may be found in THE PoLrrcs oF LAW (D.
Kairys ed. 1982).
178. G. WHnrr, supra note 146, at 238.
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cracy, and state regulatory agencies all participate, and the effected dis-
tribution decisions remain subject to review and correction (if need be,
through an act of the legislature). Judicial social policy acts as correc-
tion of errors.
Tort law in this three-fold sense-of increasing generality as an
element of breach of social duty, of increasing variability in terms of
differentiated solutions for specific social constellations of interests, and
of developed procedurality in terms of a reflexive solution mechanism
for the question of distribution and control policy--can be described,
in Calabresi's words, as the "paradigmatic law of the mixed society."1
79
179. G. Calabresi, Torts-The Law of the Mixed Society, in AMERICAN LAW: TIlE TiIIRD
CENTURY. THE LAW BICENTENNIAL VOLUME 103, 104 (B. Schwartz ed. 1976).
(Vol, 6
